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Introduction
The Liquid Rocket Booster study conducted by The Space Systems Division of General
Dynamics Corporation was intended to identify concepts for Liquid Rockets to replace the
current NSTS Solid Rocket Boosters with minimum impa_ to the on-going Shuttle Program and
increased reliability and performance capability. Additional objectives of the study were to
provide pressure fed propulsion system concepts for consideration and to provide baseline data
for potential ALS or Stand-Alone booster configurations.
Eagle Engineering, Inc. provided technical support to General Dynamics during this study. A set
of specific tasks were identified to be completed by Eagle. As the study progressed the effort
was re-oriented to satisfy the demands of changing groundrttles. The data in this report reflects
activity under the original task arrangement and the revised groundrules. Significant support
was also provided to General Dynamics in development of the LRB integration plan.
Task 1 Summary Report
Task 1 of the STS Liquid Rocket Booster (LRB) study required Eagle Engineering, Inc. to
supply current data relative to the Space Shuttle vehicle and systems affected by an LRB
substitution.
The material transmitted consisted of selected data from NASA documents including the Space
Shuttle Flight and Ground Systems Specification (JSC 07700, Vol. X), the Shuttle Operational
Data Book (SD73-SH-01801i), and Interface Control Documents, as well as other NASA
documents and records.
Table 1 lists those data products which were submitted individually due either to General
Dynamics specific request or in compliance with the basic requirement. Much of this material
was extracted from the Systems Integration Review (SIR), and Ascent Flight Systems Integra-
tion Review (AFSIG) meeting minutes and presentation material, as well as various other
sources.
Table II lists those data products applicable to SRB/LRB that were part of the return to flight
Design Certification Review (DCR) being conducted to certify the Shuttle System for resuming
the flight program.
This task was extended to provide data products as the need arose.
Data Transmittals to GDSS
Liquid Rocket Booster Study
Table I
Item
LRB Studies, Shuttle Constraints Summary (Huntsville)
JSC 07700 SRB requirements and applicability to LRB
JSC critical design review data relative to crew escape
STS-26 trajectory design data package
Reference mission descriptions and related configuration and performance data
WTR PRM-4 baseline trajectory groundrules
STS-51-L fluids budget, weight and C.G. data
LRB effect of increased length and diameter on orbiter loads
Action item: Booster aerodynamics and flight to wind tunnel comparison
SSME POGO suppressor information
Eagle report 86-150 = SSME Startup Transient at
LRB heating data and STS-26 abort planning
Shuttle ascent key events from STS 61C
Design issues = review comments
SSME ignition timing and propellant usage data
Ascent abort gaps from STS 5, 6, & 9
LRB heating data
Abort boundaries STS g & 5
Intact abort windows
NSTS aerodynamics co-efficients (Hard copy and floppy disk)
10-14-87
10-30-87
11-05-87
11-09-87
11-09-87
11 =09-87
11-09-87
11-16-87
11-16-87
11-16-87
11-16-87
11-17-87
11-19-87
11-19-87
11-20-87
11-23-87
11=23-77
11=25=87
11-25-87
11-25-87
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Table I (Cont.)
LRB Constraints Data Book
SRB/Shuttle/E'l" Longitudinal Aerodynamics
Hold down post deflections
DCR material (see separate list)
Orbiter/E'r ICD, STS ICD-2-12001
SRB/E"I" ICD, STS ICD-2-24001
Relative Impact of LRB Candidates on Flight Control
11-30-87
12-01-87
12-14-87
01-08-88
01-13-88
01-13-88
02-25-88
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Design Certification Review Transmittals
Liquid Rocket Booster Study
Table n
STS 84-0575 Space Shuttle IV'BC-3
Aerodynamic Heating Data Book, SRB-Ascent, May 24, 1984.
STS 84-0;259 IVBC-3: SRB Plume Heating Data Book, October 1984.
STS 82-0570 Space Shuttle System, SRB Separation Verification for Operations,
November 1982.
SD 74-SH-0144E Space Shuttle Program Thermal Interfaces Design Data Book IV'BC-3,
preliminary copy, September 1987.
SD 73-SH-0178 Space Shuttle Flight Systems Performance Data Book, Volume 1 C -
ascent, SDM Baseline, December 1975.
STS 84-0044 Integrated Vehicle Baseline Characterization (IVBC-3), Ascent GN&C
Summary Report, Volume 1: Basic & Appendixes A through D; and
Volume 2: Appendixes E & F, April 1984.
Transmittal of IVBC-3 Roll Maneuver Limit Loads for Steel Case SRB's.
IVBC-3 and FWC (Filament Wound Case), Cycle 3, Orbiter High Q Loads, Revision D.
Transmittal of Revised IVBC-3 and Filament Wound Case (FWC), Cycle 3, External Tank and
Solid Rocket Booster High Q Loads Documentation, Revision A.
Additional IVBC-3 Solid Rocket Booster High Q Loads.
Update to the Overpressure Data Book, STS 83-0540, containing:
1) 87-100 SRB IOP Environment for Pc (Max) Specification Requirements (Feb. 16, 1987),
2) 87-409 Methodology for Incorporating Pc Max. Change in SRB Ignition Overpressure
Environment (March 27, 1987).
Transmittal of Aerodynamic Data Updates to the Aerodynamics Data Book, SD72-SH-0060-2L.
Transmittal of Shuttle Liftoff Loads for VAFB Launches with Cycle 3 Filament Wound Case
Boosters (EMS 280-205-354).
Nominal Position and Maximum Excursions in X,Y, and Z Axes for Design of a Ground
Umbilical/Bottom of SRB Skirt Interface.
Additional 1W'BC-3 High Q Orbiter/ET Attach Load Conditions for Orbiter Assessment.
Table 1I (Cont.)
SRB Time Consistent Liftoff Loads for Design Certification Review.
IVBC-3 Post High Q Loads.
Shuttle Liftoff Loads for Design Certification Review.
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Preliminary Vehicle and Facilities Impacts Assessments
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1.0 Introduction
The primary emphasis of the Liquid Rocket Booster (LRB) study has been to define an ahemate
boost stage launch system for the Space Shuttle with enhanced safety, reliability, and perform-
ance characteristics. Additionally, the LRB must be integratable with Space Shuttle ground and
flight systems with minimum impact. The purpose of this task (Task If) therefore is to evaluate
and compare shuttle impacts of candidate LRB configuration in concert with overall trades of
analysis activity.
The initial plan included Shuttle assessments of all proposed configurations and was planned to
be completed within three months. The effort was delayed due to configuration definition and
the down-selection process occurring simultaneously. The activity was redefined for the second
half of the study to concentrate on three selected configurations with emphasis on flight loads,
separation dynamics, and cost comparison. This report covers only the first half activity.
2.0 Purpose
The purpose of this report is to provide the status of Task II through March 31, 1988. Tasks to
define the impacts of ascent flight loads, booster separation, and costs are in process and will be
included in the final report. The five configurations being assessed, (See Figure 1) are as
follows:
Principle
Configuration prgpellant _ Features
IB LO2/RP-I Pressure-Fed Closest to SRB Geometric
parameters
5A LO2/LH2 Pump-Fed Same propellant as current
SSME's
5D LO2N, P-1 Pump-Fed
5J LO@/LH2 NSTS SSME
5K LO2/RP-1 Saturn F-1
3.0 Summary of LRB Groundrules, Constraints and Design Factors
The primary groundrules utilized in assessing the impact of the LRB designs on the NSTS
vehicle, facilities, and operations are:
(1) Provide capability to launch 70000 pounds to 150 nm orbit.
(2) Provide safe abort capability with one LRB or SSME engine out with a goal to be
capable of abort to 105 nm orbit with one engine out.
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(3) Use existing NSTS constraints for maximum aerodynamic pressure, maximum gravity
forces; day-of-launch winds; launch probability; systems dispersions; flight performance
reserves; Orbiter and External Tank structural design, etc.
(4) No redesign of the Orbiter and E-'r thermal protection system (TPS).
(5) No redesign of the ET interface attachments.
(6) Minimum impact to Shuttle avionics and software design.
(7) Minimal changes to KSC facilities and GSE.
(8) Retain current Shuttle vehicle stability and control margins.
The primary LRB factors that must be considered in assessing these impacts are:
(1) Diameter
Proximity and moldline effects on Orbiter and ET.
Aeroheating impact on Orbiter and ET thermal protection system (TPS).
Utilization of existing ET interface struts and fittings.
Modification requirements for the mobile launch platform (ML).
Orbiter structural loads impacts including wing (aerodynamic effects).
(2) Length
Aeroelastic effects.
LRB/ET forward attach loads.
Flight control system effects.
Modification requirements for KSC facilities/GSE.
assembly, etc.)
(LRB processing handling,
(3) Number of Engines
Thrust vector control (TVC) authority,
Abort options.
MLP flame hole modifications.
Startup/shutdown sequence.
Safety/Reliability.
Integrated avionics requirements.
Lift-off thrust-to-weight ratio.
(4) Mass Properties
Propellant tank arrangement.
TVC authority.
LRB/ET interface loads.
(5) Type of Propellant
Performance.
Atmosphere quality.
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Waterquality.
PlantsandanimalLife.
Noise/acoustics level.
Handling/loading/spills.
Transportation.
Ground Handling and Loading.
4.0 LRB Impact to NSTS Ground and Flight Systems and Operations
4.1 Aerothermodynamic Evaluation of LRB Configurations
The LRB configurations were assessed to determine the impact on the heating to the baseline
shuttle system, primarily the Orbiter and ET thermal protection system (TPS). All LRB
configurations are longer than the SRB, and were evaluated by examining the location of each
LRB nose tip relative to the ET. the resultant shock impingement from the LRB nose onto the
higher heating regions of the ET forebody was assessed for its impact on the baseline TPS. The
longer LRB's are thought to have minimal effect on the Orbiter forebody TPS. A qualitative
assessment was made of the plume effects on the base region of the Shuttle system.
Proposed changes to the Shuttle system could impact the baseline TPS design if heating rates
produced by these changes exceed the existing material capabilities. Thus, examination of the
ET TPS layout and comparisons of heating rates for the ET design with those predicted with the
LRB's were made. The majority of the tank is covered with a spray-on-foam insulator (SOFI),
which has a heating rate limit of 10 BTU/sq-ft-sec. Various thicknesses are tabulated ranging
from 2.15 inches at station 371 (x/1 = 0.024) to 1.0 inch (required to protect against ice/frost on
the pad) at station 570 (x/1 = 13). A Super Light Ablator (SLA), which can withstand heating
rates as high as 30 BTU/sq-ft-sec, is located under the feedlines and in the forward region of the
nose which experience high heating rates from the shock off of the 30/10 degree conical tip. A
slightly denser spray-on-foam, NCFI, covers the El" base region.
Two assumptions were made in developing the predicted rates for the LRB's. One is that they
are attached at the same ET location as the SRB, and two, that the shock impingement distance,
which occurs approximately 0.055 to 0.075 ET body lengths aft of the SRB nose tip, forward
movement of the shock impingement location, the baseline value of the shock on the intertank is
removed. The magnitude of the protuberance effect of the attachment may be lower for the
L_'s but not felt. The high heating observed on the intertank is due to the shock from the SRB
compound by the presence of the ET/SRB attachment. However, the intertank region is
protected only with CPR due to the massive structure being able to tolerate the high heating.
Examination of Configurations 5A, 5D, and 5K show that a small region on the ET ogive would
experience heating rates that exceed the SOFI limit and would require a modification to the TPS,
such as a strip of SLA. The differences of the effect of these three concepts on the El" is small,
with Configuration 5K being the smallest. The least TPS impact would be from Configuration
IB. No SLA would be required but perhaps concepts 1B and 5A would not be an additional TPS
impact but may require a structural change to the intertank. The largest TPS impact would be
experienced with Configuration 5J. The location of the nose tip is such that the shock impinges
exactly on the nose region that experiences the high heating from the ET conical tip shock
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impingement.The possibility of thetwo phasescompoundingthe flow field effect resultedin a
factor of 2 differences predicted for the LRB effect peak value. If the maximum heating rate is
40 BTU per square-foot-second then an ablator, such as MA25 could replace the SLA. If the
heating rate is as high as 80 BTU per square-foot-second, this exceeds the MA25 capability of
75 and might require a major TPS modification. A change to the length would be recommended.
Only a qualitative assessment can be made of the plume environment on the base region of the
shuttle pending further definition of the concepts. A detailed analysis will be required once the
configurations are better def'med. Visual inspection of the engine arrangements and associated
vehicle configuration indicate little, ff any, differences would be detected among the five
concepts.
The primary factors effecting plume base heating are: number of engines; nozzle area ratio;
combustion chamber pressure; nozzle exit location; plume radiation characteristics; and vehicle
base pressure. The environments are likely to be reduced for the LH2/LO2 propellants and
increased for the LO2/R.P-1 propellants. State-of-the-art ablators are available in the event the
ET LH2 tank bulkhead requires additional thermal protection. Total vehicle base pressure must
be evaluated to assure that the selected configuration does not seriously affect convective base
heating environments. However, if the LRB engine plumes are located to stay within the current
SRB plume boundaries at each altitude, then one could assume that the induced aerodyn_maic
effects on the Orbiter/ET would be similar.
In summary, the thermal examination of the LRB concepts' effect on the shuttle system
indicated Configuration 1B as having the least impact on the ET TPS, and Configuration 5J as
having the largest. The remaining three concepts, 5A, 5D and 5K, would require a small strip of
ablator material, possibly SLA, to the ET ogive in order to accommodate their thermal impact.
No discriminators for the plume impact are obvious among the concepts; however, Configura-
tion 5K appears to be the least attractive.
4.2 Flight Operations Evaluation of LRB Configurations
4.2.1 Flight Rules and Procedures
The majority of flight operations impacts involve changes to flight operations procedures. With
four throttleable engines per liquid booster, there are more possible actions to consider. New
flight rules and procedures must be developed to consider all options.
The flight rules and procedures changes for a liquid rocket booster system will be much more
significant than a typical engine modification. New flight techniques, failure modes, and
procedures for operating and managing the liquid boosters must be developed and evaluated.
Updates to the launch commit criteria and the redundant set launch sequencer must be addressed.
Abort rules must be rewritten to reflect the enhanced abort capabilities made possible by liquid
rocket boosters. New abort rules will be a significant part of the new flight operations proce-
dures required.
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4.2.2 Software
New flight operations software must be developed, tested, and certified to reflect the changes
caused by solid rocket boosters. Software development for LRB's will be more extensive than
for SRB's due to more complex valves, pumps, liquid level, slosh effects, etc., and to the
increased number of engines per booster. Extensive modifications will have to be made to the
software and the software must be taken through a rigorous verification process before flight.
The control functions of liquid rocket boosters (e.g., valves, flows, pumps, temperatures,
pressures, etc.) are more complex than those of solid rocket boosters, the orbiter pre-launch, pad
switch-over and orbiter ascent phase software requirements for monitoring and controlling the
LRB's will be more complex.
Another factor contributing to increased software development is the number of LRB engines.
Four throttleable engines per booster adds to both the complexity and reliability of the STS
system. Onboard software must be developed to prevent a thrust imbalance caused by the loss or
degradation of an LRB engine.
Each of the proposed liquid rocket booster concepts all orbiter capability with loss of one LRB
engine and enhances the abort capabilities with orbiter main engine degradation. New software
must be developed to reflect these new flight capabilities and procedures. Software to throttle
LRB engines must be developed.
The larger sizes of the liquid rocket booster concept studied will produce new aerodynamic
forces and moments for which the orbiter ascent flight control software will have to compensate.
New orbiter software builds, integration, test, and extensive verification will be required
regardless which liquid rocket booster design is chosen. Software compensation for slosh in the
new LRB tanks will have to be developed and tested.
If the liquid rocket booster has more than two controlled thrusting nozzles, then additional ascent
thrust vector control drivers will have to be implemented in the orbiter avionics. This require-
ment in turn would impose additional complexity to the orbiter's ascent flight control software.
Studies will have to be made to see if the addition of LRB throttling capability and the possibili-
ty of different LRB thrust prof'zles change the area over which the external tank operates.
Possible impacts of the proposed liquid rocket booster system on the Shuttle Avionics Integra-
tion Laboratory (SAIL), Shuttle simulators, Software Production Facility, System Integration
Schedule D Contract, and on the STS Operations Contract (STSOC) must be evaluated.
4.2.3 Training and Simulations
Training and simulations must be updated for flight crews and flight control operators to learn in
the new procedures required by the more complex control functions of liquid rocket boosters.
The new abort capabilities will change the nature of abort simulations, resulting in fewer Trans-
Oceanic Abort Landing (TAL) and Return to Launch Site (RTLS) simulations and more Abort
Once Around (AOA) and Abort to Orbit (ATO) simulations. New malfunction procedures for
liquid rocket booster leaks or hardware failure must be incorporated into the simulations. The
orbiter crew must be trained to use a few new displays, monitors, and caution and warning
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indicators,aswell assomenew manualoverride switches. Initial hardware training costs will
include updating the displays, controls, and the caution and warning lights in the orbiter mock-
ups, training consoles, and in the Mission procedures.
4.2.4 Payload Integration
Payload integration will not be impacted by the substitution of liquid rocket boosters if the liftoff
and ascent loads environment of the Shuttle System using liquid rocket boosters matches or is
within the present envelope of the system using solid rocket boosters. The current liftoff and
ascent loads environment is described in NSTS 07700, Volume 14, Attachment 1 (ICD-2-
19001). If the loads are within the present envelope, the substitution will be transparent to the
payload community.
4.2.5 Pre- and Post-Flight Analysis
Flight analysis will be required to assess impacts in several areas. Modifications will be required
throughout the entire onboard guidance system. Ascent procedures will have to be rewritten and
evaluated. The abort region detemainator (ARD), which defines actual abort times based on
vehicle performance, must be expanded to accommodate the increased engine number and
complexity. Greater Abort to Orbit (ATO) capability will minimize Return to Launch Site
(RTLS) and Trans-Oceanic Abort Landing (TAL) considerations, and may eventually simplify
,ascent procedures once the new software and procedures have been evaluated.
4.2.6 Real-Time Flight Control Impacts
A LRB system would require at least one new display similar to that for the Space Shuttle main
engines. The substitution of more complex and versatile liquid rocket boosters will require the
addition of one new back.room booster console, specializing in the valves, flows, pumps,
temperatures, pressures, and maLfimction procedures of liquid rocket boosters during pre-launch,
launch and ascent phases.
The Booster flight control position is responsible for monitoring the main propulsion system
(MPS) including the Space Shuttle main engines, external tank, and solid rocket boosters during
pre-launch, launch and ascent phases.
In switching to any of the proposed liquid booster systems, the complexity of the Booster
console operator's work will depend on the number of possible actions, and on the amount
covered by software. Also, the orbiter crew needs the capability to manually shut down the LRB
engines.
Real-time data transmitted to the ground about the liquid rocket boosters might require a
separate transmitter, located on a booster. In this case, electromagnetic interference concerns
must be checked pre-flight. However, this small increased downlist data requirement during
ascent would have very little impact on flight control communications.
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4.3 Integrated Structural Loads and Dynamics Evaluation of LRB Configurations
4.3.1 Plume Ignition Overpressure
The primary factors effecting plume ignition overpressure on the Orbiter base heat shield are:
number of engines; thrust buildup rate; and engine ignition sequence. The orbiter heat shield
structural limit is approximately 1.3 psi. The overpressure generated by the SSME's is signifi-
candy below this limit. The overpressure generated by the SRB's exceed the 1.3 psi limit, thus
requiring overpressure control capability designed into the ground launch facilities. AIthough
the overpressure generated by the LR.B's must be evaluated, there are several factors that
influence the magnitude of the LR.B ignition overpressure which may negate the requirement for
overpressure control. These are the slower thrust buildup rate, lower thrust level engines, and
the engine ignition sequence.
4.3.2 Acoustic Environment Effects
The acoustic environment generated by the LRB engines is a factor of: number of engines;
nozzle area ratio; engine operating pressure; and propellant combination. Most Shuttle payloads
are sensitive to acoustic environment. However, most payloads launched on the Shuttle are
designed to be compatible with the current Shuttle acoustic environment. Some Shuttle
hardware also has upper operating limits. Both the Orbiter SSME's and SRB's are major
sources of high acoustics, thus the combined effects must be considered. Cun'ently, MLP high
flow capacity water spray systems control acoustic levels prior to lift-off.
Such a system will be required for the LRB; however, this does not appear to be a problem for
any of the configurations assessed. The current Shuttle experiences maximum acoustics after
lift-off at an altitude of approximately 80 feet. Test and analyses will be required to assure
acceptable environments exist or if corrective measures must be implemented. Meeting current
interface limits with payloads will be a prime consideration.
4.3.3 Vehicle Dynamics Analysis/POGO Control
The current Shuttle has a POGO suppression system. The dynamic response with the I.,R,B will
require additional analyses/testing. Changes to the current POGO system are anticipated since
active suppression will probably be a requirement for the LRB.
4.3.4 Engine Start Sequence/Stagger Time
The start sequence/stagger start time for the total Shuttle will have to be assessed for vehicle/
facility optimization.
4.3.5 Dynamics of LRB Separation from Shuttle
Thrust from the LRB's can be terminated or reduced, thus permitting separation from the Orbiter
at different times during flight, which was not the case with the SRB's. It will be necessary to
develop analysis and test data relating to separation characteristics of the LRB as a function of
generally different ascent scenarios including intact and contingency abort modes. This will be
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oneof themajor systemareasthatwill requirefull recertificatiort/reverificationthroughtestand
analyses.
4.3.6 Effect of LRB Length and Diameter on Structural Loads
The primary concem with changing the booster mold lines from the current SRB configuration is
the effect of aerodynamic loading on the Orbiter wing and Orbiter/ET attach fittings and struts
during flight through the maximum dynamic pressure regime. The results of tests conducted by
MSFC indicate that there is a significant effect on the Orbiter aerodynamics due to LRB
diameter. The diameter should be limited to 15 feet unless additional wind tunnel data is
obtained. Other observations are:
(l) Strakes should not be used as a method to permit LR.B diameters greater than 15 feet
unless additional wind tunnel data is obtained.
(2) Increasing the Orbker incidence angle is not recommended due to increased payload bay
door structural loads at negative angle-of-attack.
4.3.7 Load Factor
Due to potentially higher load factors with LRB's during first stage, the effect on ET tank
pressure loads and structural loads may require additional ascent flight constraints.
4.3.8 Pre-Launch and Lift-off Environment
The current NSTS configuration using SRB's is very senskive to the ignition sequence. During
pre-latmch operations the SSME start causes large excursions in the bending moment at the base
of the stack which is resisted at the hold-down posts. At SRB ignition and release the stack
responds to the residual moment in a manner called "twang". The twang response couples with
the rapid SRB thrust buildup response and the SRB ignition overpressure. The current ignition
sequence is designed to provide acceptable pre-launch loads and vehicle excursions without
increasing the lift-off loads.
The LRB-equipped Shuttle should provide a reduced thrust build-up and overpressure environ-
ment, but is expected to have lower stiffiaess, and a higher excursion envelope. A combination
of MLP redesign and revised ignition sequence may offset the excursions, but additional
provisions may also be required.
The lower bending frequency expected will also require significant control stability analyses for
slosh damping and other concerns during the early flight phase.
4.4 Main Propulsion System Evaluation of LRB Configuration
4.4.1 LH2/LO2 Configuration - Engine H2 Lag at Shutdown
Unburned H2 exits the SSME after the LO2 main valve has bee closed at engine shutdown.
Some of the H2 is unburned, creating an explosion potential. A new engine for the LRB
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LH2/LO2 configuration will probably have similar characteristics. The H2 quantity for the
SSME's canbemore than150poundsperengine. This problem is currendybeingassessedfor
the SSME's, and may be applicable to the LRB. Potential testing and analyses may be required
to resolve this issue for the LR.B.
4.4.2 LH2/LO2 Configuration - Pre-ignition H2 Purge
The SSME start sequence utilized a short H2 lead which is dumped through the engine nozzle.
Accumulation below the engine followed by ignition can cause unacceptable overpressure. A
H2 bum-off system has been implemented for the SSME's to assure an explosive accumulation
of H2 below the engines does not occur prior to engine ignition. A similar system will probably
be required for a LRB LH2/LO2 engine.
4.4.3 MPS Abort Analyses
The LRB will result in a number of new options for Shuttle. Thermal/fluid analyses for some of
the abort conditions will be required to determine abort capability for both intact abort require-
ments and for enhancement of contingency abort capability.
4.5 Integrated Ground Systems Evaluation of LRB Configuration
4.5.1 MLP Modifications
Engine exhaust gas from LRB nozzles will be more diffused than SRB exhaust gases. A larger
hole in the MLP may be required for this gas flow to avoid direct impingement. Modifications
will also be required for new pad venting and work platform requirements.
4.5.2 Exhaust Trench Modifications
More study is required to determine the degree of impact.
4.5.3 Prelaunch Operations for the Engine, Intertank, and Nose Cap Volumes
Large quantities of thermally controlled N2 must be provided anytime cold and/or explosive
propellants are onboard prior to vehicle lift-off. Air (possibly warmed) must be provided to
purge the engine compartment for work crews. Systems include gas storage, gas heating, duct
transport system, and control/monitoring instrumentation. Engine controllers, and other
computers and electronic/electrical equipment generally have both low/high thermal limits, thus
creating a potentially unacceptable explosive environment. The LRB configurations having no
H2 have less of a thermal problem, thus require less heat. The explosive potential and monitor-
ing requirements are less with RP propellants than with H2. The intertank and nose cap areas are
of less concern as they are smaller volumes, and have less equipment and leak sources.
4.5.4 Prelaunch Environment
The probability of ice/frost formations on the LRB is similar to the ET. Thus the current Shuttle
ice/debris requirements for the ET will also apply to the LRB, potentially impacting LRB TPS
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designs. UninsulatedRP tanks have large circumferential temperature distribution, possibly
effecting structural response/design, plus non-uniform propellant heating with the potential for
inverse propellant thermal stratification. However, this does not appear to be a significant LRB
design problem.
4.5.5 Propellant Storage and Handling
A comparison of LH2 and RP propellant storage and handling characteristics at KSC is not
completed. However, there appears to be very little difference in activating either. The primary
advantages of RP propellants over LH2 are that no bum pond or vacuum jacketed lines are
required, and is generally less complex to handle. Also, RP propellants can be loaded prior to
flight day and require no helium tank purge.
4.5.6 Ground/Vehicle System for Propellant Tank Pressurization Prior to Engine Start
The Shuttle vehicle LH2, LH2, and RP propellant tanks for a pressure-fed LRB configuration
will require pressurization prior to engine start. This will probably be accomplished with helium
or nitrogen. The current ground helium system for supplying the Orbiter will probably be
inadequate to meet LRB requirements. An interface with the onboard and ground for this system
will be a new requirement since this interface does not exist for the current configuration.
4.5.7 MLP Holddown Release Mechanism
The holddown release mechanism and associated systems will have to be modified to incorpo-
rate new LRB requirements. These are primarily modified to incorporate new LRB requirements.
These are primarily associated with the requirement to delay release until the health of all of the
LRB engines has been verified, and the communication of these data to the Orbiter/ground
controller. Additional studies are required to determine the optimum release procedure.
4.5.8 Pneumatic Supply
The LRB will increase the requirements for pressurized helium and nitrogen for various engine
seal and cavity purges; valve actuation systems; and various flight pressurant gases. The
capability of the current system will probably have to be increased to meet these requirements.
Also, provisions must be incorporated to provide the status of these systems to ground control
during preflight and ascent operations.
4.5.9 LO2 Geysering Suppression
Gas formation in the LO2 system can result in large surges which can be highly destructive. The
critical phases are:
(I) During the initial propellant loading prior to line/vehicle hardware chill and before any
significant quantities of liquid are in the vehicle lines.
(2) Once a significant quantity of liquid is in the lines or lines and vehicle_
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The Shuttlehasdef'medgroundhandlingand loadingproceduresthat preventgeyseringin the
ET. This will have to be assessed for the LRB, as the problem becomes very complex during
loading, preflight and flight for multi-line vehicles with independent feed lines.
4.6 Integrated Avionics Evaluation of LRB Configurations
4.6.1 MPS Operation During Flight and Shutdown
Without adequate communication between the [.RB and Orbiter to maximize performance,
flexibility, and safety, the LRB becomes little more than an SRB. Communications for flight
control existed for the SRB; however, k becomes more complex for the LRB with more engines,
engine out, and the potential for variable thrust capability. Some of the many considerations
include: vehicle control; vehicle structural loading capability; variable payload weights, various
abort capabilities, etc. Minimizing the impact to the Shuttle integrated avionics hardware and
software in utilizing these LR.B features to enhance performance and safety is a key program
driver.
The DC power required by the LRB's will likely be greater than that required by the SRB's.
Power for pumps and valves to route, transport, and throttle the liquid fuel and oxidizer would be
expected to add to the power required for thrust vector control, rate gyros, range safety, etc. If
the LRB's are retained longer during the ascent phase for improved performance, the demand for
Orbiter power would be for a longer period. Dependence upon the Orbiter for DC power may be
excessive.
LRB's will require a Development Flight Instrumentation (DFI) package. Flight of the DFI
package during the development flights may impact the Orbiter payload bay volume; thus, the
payload carrying capacity. A DFI package for LRB's may be more extensive than was the SRB
DFI due to more complex valves, pumps, liquid level, slosh effects, etc. Thus, additional cables
or data multiplexing schemes may be required.
If the LRB's to be substituted for the LRB's have more than two (2) controlled thrusting nozzles,
then additional Ascent Thrust Vector Control (ATVC) drivers will have to be implemented in the
Orbiter avionics. This requirement in turn would impose additional complexity to the Orbiter
ascent flight control software. All new software will require extensive test and verification.
Substitution of LRB's with different mold lines will result in new aerodynamic forces and
moments which the Orbiter ascent flight control software will have to compensate for. Thus,
new Orbiter software builds, integration, test, and extensive verification will be required no
matter what the LRB configuration is. Software compensation for slosh in the new LRB tanks
will have to be developed, tested, etc.
Since the control functions of LRB's ate more complex than SRB's, e.g., valves, flows, pumps,
temperatures, pressures, etc. the Orbiter/LPS prelaunch, pad switch-over and Orbiter ascent
phase software requirements for monitoring and controlling the 1.1LB's will be more complex.
Thus, it should be expected that extensive modifications will have to be made to the software
and the software must be taken through a rigorous verification process.
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Incorporationof Built-in Test Equipment (BITE) in a replacement LRB could result in more
extensive BITE coverage due to the more complex nature of LRB's over SRB's requiring
additional Orbiter and Launch Processing System (LPS) software and its verification.
4.7 Integrated GN&CS Evaluation of LRB Configurations
4.7.1 Vehicle Control During LRB Shutdown
SRB thrust mismatch during shutdown is of significant concern to vehicle control. Normal LRB
operation during a similar time frame should be more favorable. For abnormal operations the
situation worsens. Analysis/testing is required to develop satisfactory operational methods.
4.7.2 Requirement for TVC on the LRB
In order for the LRB to integrate into the current Shuttle configuration, TVC capability on the
LRB is considered mandatory. The Orbiter design has taken advantage of weight reductions by
not being burdened with any requirements for providing control muscle during boost. The fact
that the SSME's are gimbaUed at all is due primarily to reduce loads in the Orbiter/nET attach
struts. The subsequent paragraphs provide the background and justification for the current SRB
requirements which can be used as a basis for establishing the TVC requirements for the selected
LRB configuration.
The 5.0 degree SRB gimbal angle requirement was established from six degrees of freedom
dynamics simulations, using three sigma specification value of SRB thrust mismatch at tailoff,
and putting a reasonable limitation on the amount of unwanted attitude excursion that would be
tolerated. Mismatch was the main driver but also considered were thrust misalignment, Orbiter
engine out, winds, and a design goal of avoiding girnbal angle saturation. In the max q flight
phase there is a requirement for approximately 2.0 degrees of total SRB thrust trim in the pitch
plane for the sole purpose of providing the required qx bias in the mean wind condition. Adding
SRB thrust misalignment, wind shear effects, avionics failure (RM) transient, and Orbiter engine
failure transients (not all simultaneously) consumes practically all of the entire 5.0 degrees, with
practically nothing left over for linear control. Another design goal in addition to avoiding
hitting the stops due to external disturbances, was to reserve i.0 degrees for dynamic control of
propellant slosh and to respond to attitude change command from guidance.
The 5.0 degrees per second rate requirement was established originally to provide a "bare bones"
capability for "dynamic loads suppression", an original Level II Program requirement. This
means phase stabilized vibration and/or slosh modes. Realizing the impracticality of this design
feature for higher order modes, due to prohibitive demand on the TVC and hydraulic systems, a
capability limit of roughly plus or minus 0.25 degrees at 3.0 Hertz was chosen. This alone
translates into the 5.0 degrees per second requirement. The 5.0 degrees per second requirement
also stems from a requirement to recover from large initial conditions on attitude and/or rate
error, since it can be viewed as a limit on vehicle angular acceleration rate (jerk). Limits on
acceleration rate in an otherwise linear second order system, produces instability beyond some
bound on initial conditions.
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TheseandotherboosterTVC requirementswereestablishedthrough a series of meetings of the
Ascent Flight Control Panel in 1973 and early 1974, resulting in the following set of require-
ments to be baselined:
(I) Actuator mount geometry at 45 and 135 degrees from the plane of symmetry (as opposed
to 0 to 90 degrees).
(2) Square gimbal capability pattern.
(3) Design load for actuator of 130,000 pounds.
(4) 5.0 degree usable displacement in each axis simultaneously.
(5) 5.0 degrees per second simultaneously for both actuators under full load.
(6) Minimum gimbal angle acceleration capability of 2.0 radians per second at rated load.
(7) Total duty cycle of 140 degrees per motor (read single booster thrust).
These requirements were formally transmitted to the SRB Project, from Level II, on February
12, 1974.
A word of caution on vehicle configuration. Aerodynamic moment coefficients, in a body axis
system of coordinates, is perhaps the most significant design driver on TVC requirements for
launch vehicle, i.e., the entire stack. Ideally they should be as small as possible for pure attitude
control, but in the direction of aerodynamic stability for load relief control (an Orbiter require-
ment). Moving the booster nose cones forward to gain volume would shift the center of pressure
forward, and locating the oxidizer tank aft of the fuel tank would move the center of gravity aft.
Both of these effects will tend to increase the 'rvc requirements and complicate the intricate
interaction between flight control and structural loads.
4.8 LRB Cost Impacts Assessments
Relative cost impacts to the NSTS systems of incorporating various configurations using a
variety of propellant combinations, engine packages, and geometries was completed in the first
half of the study. Development of cost models and estimates of the cost impacts for flight
software, test hardware, and operational spares will be completed and reported in the final report.
Operations cost estimates will also be completed using an Eagle modified version of the KSC
Operations Cost Model. The model will provide estimates of a range of traffic models using
variable assumptions.
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Task HI of the STS Liquid Rocket (LRB) study required Eagle Engineering, Inc. to develop
design guidelines and requirements to minimize impacts to the Space Shuttle system from an
LRB substitution.
Five potential liquid rocket booster configurations were assessed in this phase of the liquid
rocket booster study. These configurations consist of one pump fed system using modified
existing Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSMEs), one pump fed system using modified existing
Saturn F-1 engines, two newly designed pump fed engine concepts using LO2/LH2 or LO2/RP-I
fuels, and one pressure fed system using LO2/RP-1. The following lists the liquid rocket booster
concepts:
Configuratign PropeLlant JKog_
1B LO2/RP- 1 Pressure-Fed
5A LO2/LH2 Pump-Fed
5D LO2/RP-1 Pump-Fed
5J LO2/LH2 NSTS SSME
5K LO2/RP-1 Saturn F-1
The first four configurations have 4 engines per liquid rocket booster, while configuration 5K
has 2 engines per LRB. Each of the liquid rocket booster concepts considered is capable of
lifting a 70 Klb payload to 150 n mi orbit. 28.5 degrees inclination with orbiter SSME's limited
to 100 percent PL. The boosters must also be capable of lifting a 59 Klb payload to 150 n mi
orbit, 28.5 degrees inclination, with orbiter SSME's limited to 104 percent PL. Avionics and
power systems were assumed to be common to all concepts.
The design guidelines and requirements to minimize impacts to the Space Shuttle system for
these five liquid rocket booster configurations are as follows:
The primary design guidelines and requirements of a liquid rocket booster system reflect the first
order selection criteria.
Improved safety is a prime reason for considering liquid rocket boosters as potential solid
booster replacements. Liquid rocket boosters should be designed with safety enhancements,
such as the capability for intact aborts with one LRB engine out at lift-off, and possible enhanced
orbit capability with degradation or loss of a Space Shuttle main engine.
Improved environmental acceptability is another advantage of liquid rocket boosters over solids.
Liquid rocket booster designs improve the hazardous near field acid cloud produced by solid
boosters. Liquid rocket boosters also prevent the destruction of the ozone layer caused by the
combustion of solids.
Other goals of the liquid rocket booster program include Space Transportation System (STS)
integration with minimum impact to the STS and launch site. Liquid rocket booster concepts
were developed to minimize impacts to the orbiter, external tank, launch site, and ground support
equipment.
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Liquid rocketboosterreliability is alsoof prime concem. Sincethe control functionsof liquid
rocket boosters(e.g.,valves,flows, pumps,temperatures,pressures,etc.) aremorecomplexthan
thoseof solid rocketboosters,the orbiter pre-launch,padswitch-overand orbiter ascentphase
software requirementsfor monitoring and controlling the LRBs will be more complex. The
greatercomplexityof liquids oversolidsrequiresaddedattentionto LRB reliability.
In addition to the basicdesignrules and guidelineslisted above,the following areasmust be
consideredin thedevelopmentof a liquid rocketboostersystem:
LRB Maximum Diameter
The maximum liquid rocket booster diameter shall be constrained to prevent increases in wing
loading due to aerodynamic flow distortions. The maximum allowable diameter is approximate-
ly fifteen feet. See "Liquid Rocket Boosters - Effect of Increased Length and Diameter" in the
Special Reports Summaries section for more information.
Flight Load Assessments
A key consideration to potentially upgrading the National Space Transportation System (NSTS),
by replacing the solid rocket boosters (SRB's) with liquid rocket boosters (LRB's), is to assure
development of an LRB design that is compatible with the NSTS and its associated system
design constraints. Accordingly, the effects of LRB thrust, mass property and estimated element
aerodynamic characteristics on potentially critical orbiter, external tank (ET) and interface
structure were assessed throughout first stage flight for each LRB concept under study. Assess-
ments were performed using a program containing over 80 structural load indicator algorithms
that were evaluated using flight simulation trajectory parameters provided by GDSS as inputs.
Figure 1 presents two typical load indicators that were evaluated. The straight horizontal lines
denote the indicator structural limits while the lines with the triangular symbols correspond to
the same limits but with a 90% systems dispersion protection level included. The dotted line
depicts the predicted load indicator Mach-history for a particular LRB conceptual design (the
RP-1 pressure fed booster in this case). For comparison, the solid Mach-history trace depicts the
corresponding load indicator variation that would be predicted for the NSTS using its currently
baselined solid rocket booster. As indicated, the "fwd crossbeam thrust panel" indicator shows a
significant structural exceedance for the LRB case over a large portion of the trajectory beyond
M=2. Similarly, a near-exceedance is seen for the LRB case at M=2.5 for the "crossbeam lower
chord fitting" indicator.
Our assessment of the structural load indicators generated for each of the LR.B concepts studied
revealed that nearly all of the observed structural exceedances were due to excessive LRB thrust
in the high Mach number range and that these exceedances could be precluded by appropriate
LRB throttling. A recommended I.,RB throttle logic was developed based on constraining the
El" LOX tank aft dome head pressure indicator to ks maximum allowable value of 39.2 psi (see
Figure 2). This throttle logic concept also can be adapted to protect against other LRB thrust
driven load indicator exceedances should further analysis show that the aft dome head pressure
indicator does not always represent the most critical load indicator exceedances.
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LRB Estimated Aero Characteristics Assessment
Reasonableness checks were performed on the estimated element aerodynamic characteristics
that were used to generate the LRB structural load indicator assessments. While the vast
majority of the estimated aerodynamic characteristics appeared to be quite reasonable, several
anomalies were observed regarding the increments used to convert the shuttle SRB's to
appropriate LRB designs. The anomalies concerned the lateral location of the LRB normal force
aerodynamic center and the longitudinal location of the LRB side force aerodynamic center.
Subsequently, the element aerodynamic characteristics were revised to correct the observed
anomalies. However, due to programmatic priorities, updated trajectory simulations using the
revised aerodynamics could not be generated, thus precluding a rigorous reassessmem of the
load indicators. Upon request, an estimate of the effect of correcting the LRB normal force
lateral aerodynamic center was assessed (via hand calculations) relative to the aft ET/LRB
interface member loads (struts P8 through P13). Results of the analysis indicated that only the
lower horizontal struts, P9 and P12, would be critical and only for the LOX/H2 pump fed
concept at +__2.5° of sideslip.
Aerothermodynamics
The impacts to the baseline shuttle system, primarily the orbiter and external tank (ET) thermal
protection system (If'S) were studied. The shock impingement from the LRB nose onto the
higher heating regions of the ET forebody was assessed for its impact on the baseline TPS. The
longer LRB's have minimal effect on the orbiter forebody thermal protection system. With the
longer LRB's and the forward movement of the shock impingement location, the baseline value
of the shock on the intertank is removed. The magnitude of the protuberance effect of the
attachment may be lower for the LRB's. Thermal examination of the proposed liquid rocket
boosters identified configttration lb as having the least impact on the external tank thermal
protection system, and Configuration 5J as having the largest. The remaining three concepts,
5A, 5D, and 5K, would require a small strip of ablator material to the external tank in order to
accommodate their thermal impact.
Plume Heating
An assessment was made of the plume effects on the base region of the Shuttle system. Analysis
of the plume environment of the base of the Shuttle reveals little difference among the five
configurations. Plume heating is dependent on the number of engines, nozzle area ratio,
combustion chamber pressure, nozzle exit location, plume radiation characteristics, and vehicle
base pressure. The environments are likely tO be reduced for the LO2/LH2 propellants and
increased for the LO2/RP-1 propellants. Detailed plume analyses can be computed once engine
specifications are defined.
Engine Throttling
All proposed liquid rocket booster configurations will have the capability to throttle the LRB
engines. Individual throttling capability would significantly increase the preflight analyses,
software, monitoring and controls required. Therefore it "is recommended that the engines on
each booster throttle as a group.
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LRB Data Communications
Data communications for flight control becomes more complex for liquid rocket booster systems
because of more engines, various engine out or engine degradation combinations, and possible
LRB variable thrust capability. Some of the many considerations include vehicle control,
vehicle structural loading capability, variable payload weights, various abort capabilities, etc.
The new liquid rocket boosters must.be designed to mininuz" • both the hardware and software
impacts to the Shuttle integrated avionics while incorporating these capabilities to enhance
performance, flexibility, and crew and vehicle safety.
LRB TPS
The external environment surrounding the liquid rocket boosters may result in ice/frost forma-
tions similar to those on the external tank. The liquid rocket boosters should be designed in
accordance with Shuttle Ice/DETSRIS requirements. This design requirement may affect
proposed LR.B thermal protection system (TPS) plans, possibly effecting structural response/
design plus non-uniform propellant heating with the potential for inverse propellant thermal
stratification.
Acoustic Environment
The acoustic environment generated by the liquid rocket boosters must not exceed that generated
by current solid rocket boosters (SRBs). This constraint addresses the sensitivities of payloads
and some Shuttle hardware. Acoustic studies must consider the combined effects of Space
Shuttle Main Engine and liquid rocket booster interaction.
Liquid rocket boosters will require systems to control acoustic levels prior to lift-off similar to
the water spray systems presently used with the solid rocket booster system. The liquid rocket
boosters must be designed to accommodate the maximum Shuttle acoustics levels which occur at
approximately 80 feet altitude. In-depth tests and analyses will be required on the final configu-
ration.
LRB Separation
The liquid rocket booster system should be designed to allow LRB shutdown and separation
from the Orbiter at several times during ascent, as a function of different intact abort scenarios.
The analyses and test data relating to separation characteristics of the liquid rocket boosters will
defme the increased safety margins of the new Shuttle system. See "LRB Separation" in the
Special Report Summaries section for more information.
Hydrogen Burn-off
The Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) start sequence utilizes a short hydrogen lead which is
dumped through the engine nozzle. Accumulation below the engine followed by ignition can
cause unacceptable overpressure. This hydrogen must be burned before accumulation occurs. A
bum-off system for the liquid rocket boosters is needed similar to that of cun'ently provided for
the Space Shuttle Main Engines.
29
SSMEHydrogen
The new liquid rocket booster design should be prepared to alleviate the problem of unburned
hydrogen in the Space Shuttle Main Engines after the oxygen main valve has closed at shut-
down. This issue is currentlyunder investigationwith the Shuttleusing solidboosters. This
issue is important since there can be more than 150 pounds of hydrogen per SSME and this
unburned hydrogen creates an explosion potential. However, a solution found for the current
Shuttle system and associated solid rocket boosters may also apply to a Shuttle using liquid
rocket boosters.
LRB Release System
The proposed liquidrocketboostersmust be designed with a hold down releasemechanism and
associatedsystem to assure that allfour to eight engines have startedand are producing the
requiredthrust.These factsmust alsobe communicated to the orbiterand ground control.This
isnot requiredwith thepresentsolidrocketboosters.
LRB Purges
The liquid rocket boosters must provide for hydrogen and nitrogen purges of various engine
seals and cavities, gas supply to valve actuation systems, and flight pressurant gases. These
must be provided while _g orbiter interface and impacts.
02 Geysering Suppression
The liquid rocket boosters shall be designed to suppress oxygen geysering in supply lines. The
gas formation in the liquid oxygen system can result in large, highly destructive surges once a
significant quantity of liquid is in the line or lines and vehicle. Analyses must be made of these
very complex effectsforloading,preflight,and flight.
LRB Thrust Mismatch
The liquid rocket booster should be designed to minimize liquid rocket booster &rust mismatch.
Equal amounts of thrust should be delivered from each LRB engine for optimum ascent
trajectory and to provide even thrust balances between engines during the LRB shutdown
sequence. Analysis and testing will be necessary to develop satisfactory operational methods.
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LRB Thermal Requirements
Examination of the heating to the Liquid Rocket Booster (LRB) configurations was made in
order to determine the type of Thermal Projection System (TPS) required. The LRB heating
environments were assessed relative to the Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) design
values and two options for TPS requirements are offered.
A estimate of aerodynamic heating was made by comparing proposed trajectories with a
trajectory for which heating rates have been determined. Aerodynamic heating is a function of
the square root of atmospheric density and of the velocity cubed. Thus, at the same velocity, one
need only to compare altitudes (densities) to obtain the relative values.
Altitude vs velocity of the proposed LRB trajectories and the aeroheating ascent design
trajectory used for the Space Shuttle elements were submitted. All of the trajectories were very
similar until approximately 3000 ft/sec velocity when the Shuttle design trajectory begins to
deviate. At the time of peak heating, around 4000 ft/sec, the LRB trajectories are approximately
10,000 feet higher in altitude. This means the density is around 60 to 65 percent lower and the
heating is 26 to 28 percent lower than the Shuttle SRB. A review of the predicted heating for the
SRB revealed that a majority of the maximum heating rate values are 6.0 Btu/ft _ sec or lower
with only a few exceeding 11.0 Bra's (see LRB Thermal Requirements, Figure 1).
Insulation Requirements
Because of the Space Shuttle Program requirement to mininuz" • ice formation on the External
Tank (ET) following on-pad propellant loading to avoid ice impact on the Orbiter, a spray-on
foam insulation (SOFI) is baselined for the ET. It was found that approximately 1.0 inch
thickness of SOH satisfies the minimum ice requirement. This particular insulation material,
identified as CPR-488, has a maximum heating rate capability of 10 to 11 Btu/_ sec and is used
as an effective TPS for ascent heating.
In light of the trajectory comparisons, it is recommended that 1.0 inch of SOFI will adequately
protect the LRB cylindrical structure and no doubt the aluminum nose for the 2 shorter boosters
which are very similar to the SRB. The 2 longer LRBs may require additional TPS on their nose
tips since they extend just forward of the ET and may not be enveloped within the ET shock.
Cork would suffice for this additional TPS. For those regions of the LRB near feedlines or other
protuberances, a Super Light Ablator (SLA) is recommended until the design matures or ground
test data become available.
Two options for LRB TPS can be consider at this time; one for protection just past staging and
the other to protect the I.,RB for entry. In the case of a short time flight without the need to
survive entry, only SOFI would be required with a little SLA near major protuberances.
However, for the LRB to withstand entry heating, cork is recommended on the nose cone and
over protruding bolt heads, etc. and SLA near the cowlings and lines.
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Cost Estimation
Eagle Engineering, Inc. support to General Dynamics Liquid Rocket Booster Study included the
following cost estimates:
1. Estimates for the impact of mods to the Orbiter, and other STS elements
2. Independent assessment of LRB vehicle costs
3. Estimate of the I..RB software development costs
4. Definition of spares program
5. Definition of test program subsystem
6. Operations cost estimates
Cost Impact of Mods to the Orbiter and Other STS Elements
Cost estimates were developed for each of nine LRB configurations depending on several
parameters including the complexity of the LRB configuration and the number of engines. The
method of estimating was to develop percent changes in the STS systems as a function of the
LRB design and then apply these percentages to the original STS element DDT&E.
These estimates identified impacts on the Orbiter Vehicle, primarily in the Avionics systems,
impacts to the Flight Software, impacts on the Systems Engineering budgets, the MSFC projects
including the External Tank and the MSFC Systems budgets. The total program costs on all STS
program elements except KSC were estimated due to the modifications required to substitute an
LRB for the Solid Rocket Boosters.
LRB Vehicle Costs
This exercise was conducted in support of the General Dynamics cost estimating team and
consisted of EEI developing an independent parametric estimate of each of several LRB
configurations based on the LRB subsystem level weight statement and complexity judgments
from the EEI engineering staff. The result of this was for the customer to revise certain of his
estimates and to develop more rationale in some areas that lacked technical definition. The
conclusion that the GDSS Cost Estimating Relationships were comparable in several areas to the
EEI CEILs. Another result was that the data being supplied by the Engine manufacturers was
substantially lower than what the CER estimate of engine devdopment indicated.
Estimate of LRB Software Development Costs
In support of the GDSS cost estimating team, EEI developed an estimate for the Flight Software
for the LRB. This estimate was developed based on the size of the LRB computer memory, the
nmnber of lines of code required to program the memory and the cost software programming per
line of code. The estimate was essentially accepted by the customer and his customer as a
reasonable software estimate.
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Definition of Spares Program
Another EEI task was the definition of the Spares program and the cost of the program. This
task was accomplished by estimating the initial spares requirement the initial spares laying-by
reviewing the assumptions regarding vehicle checkout, production rates and availability. Based
on these assumptions, and the EEI knowledge of the vehicle assembly and launch sequence, an
initial spares requirement was developed which would allow the program to proceed without any
delays due to availability of spares. However, not expending large sums of money for compo-
nents that either would not be spared, such as structure, or would be available from the next
vehicle in the production line. In addition, the EEI concept allowed for the time that the vehicle
was in the VAB and on the launch pad, and certain elements would have to be replaced in a
timely manner. This analysis allowed EEI to develop an initial spares requirement. The second
part of this task involved estimating the operational spares requirement once the initial spares
laying was established. This was again estimated assuming a "piggy back" spares concept with a
probability of sufficiency (POS) of 85 to 90 percent. Once the spares requirement is established,
then the cost is estimated based on subsystem and LRU costs.
Definition of Test Program
This EEI task consisted of two elements. First was the estimate by subsystem of the test
hardware requirements. These estimates were developed by examining each LRB subsystem
such as structure, avionics, TVC and other and making an engineering judgement of what tests
were required for those individual subsystems. After developing the test requirements for
subsystem development, qualification and certification, EEI converted these into equivalent
subsystems and then a cost estimate was developed based on the cost of the individual subsys-
tem. Second, the integrated test program requirements were developed based on developing
analogies between the LRB engine programs and the Space Shuttle Main Engine integrated test
program conducted at NSTL. For example it was felt that an integrated test program such as the
STS Main Propulsion Test Program (MPTA) would be required. This test program was not for
the engines alone rather for the total integrated LRB vehicle. In addition, a series of tests were
defined based on the EEI technical knowledge of the test requirements.
Operations Cost Estimates
Eagle Engineering had the task to develop the total Operations cost estimates for the LR_
program including facilities cost estimates, launch cost estimates and sustaining manpower cost
estimates. As part of this task, the KSC launch operations cost model was obtaine.d from KSC
personnel and modified to fit the LRB program.
First, the facility requirements were developed based on the study done by the Shuttle Processing
Contractor in support of the LRB study. Using the parameters from the KSC launch operations
cost model, the price of the new facilities was developed. This estimate was broken into R&D
and C of F in order that the customer could differentiate between budgets.
Second, the launch operations costs were estimated, again utilizing the modified KSC launch
operations model. This model uses vehicle parameters, mission models, technology and several
other parameters to estimate the total launch operations costs. EEI then took this output and
separated out costs that would not be chargeable to the LRB program, such as R & PM costs like
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utilities and security, and developed the EEl estimate of the LRB launch operations costs
assuming certain variable costs per launch and certain other costs such as f'Lxed launch opera-
tions manpower.
Third, EEl presented this analysis to GDSS showing the total launch operations cost per flight,
cost per lb. of payload in orbit and total fixed and variable manpower.
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Flight Control Impact of LRB Candidates
The subject comparison has been performed for the Ascent Flight Control discipline.
configurations examined are identified below. They are:
Pump Fed
Existing Engines: SSME 1
F-1 2
New Engines: LO2/LH2 3
LO2/RP1 4
Pressure Fed LO2/RP1 5
The five
The statement of work requested an evaluation of changes required for each, in both the pre-
launch and ascent environments. Also, supply supporting rationale, and rank in order of impact.
In the Ascent Flight Control System area the major discriminators appear to be as follows:
A. Number of engines
• Number of T'VC drivers required (four per actuator X 2 per engine)
• Liftoff T/W with one engine out (impacts tower clearance margins)
B. Length of Booster
• Aerodynamic stability (longer booster moves CP forward)
• Lowest bending mode frequency (longer boosters tend to imply lower f_equen-
cies, all else-equal)
C. LOX Tank forward or aft
• Aerodynamic stability
(LOX Tank forward is a dramatic improvement)
• Stiffness
(LOX Tank forward requires higher load bearing fuel tank skin -- stiffer)
D. Pressure fed or pump - Pressure fed requires thick tank wails -- stiffer
The above categorization of discriminators are in the obvious differences between the configura-
tions.
A.
B.
Notice that they all are evaluated by a different set of discriminators, these being:
Avionics impact (#TVC servo valve driver amplifiers)
Liftoff T/W with engine out
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C. Degreeof AerodynamicStability
D. LowestFirst Bendingmodefrequency
Let us eliminate the first two from this list, since they provide absolutely no discrimination
between fottr of the five configurations and have offsetting virtues for the remaining configura-
tion (F-I engines). This leaves only two major discriminators for the evaluation.
Before doing the actual evaluation, which is the latter part of the task, we address the first part,
i.e. changes required for pre-launch and ascent phases. In the prelaunch phase there would be
changes to the girnbal test program and its pertinent "Launch Commit Criteria". In the ascent
phase there would be changes in FCS filter coefficients, loop gains, trim profiles, discreets, and
guidance tables. For the most part this would entail changes of existing software parameters (aU
of which are not "l-Load") with very little actual software structure changes. There is an
avionics hardware impact for addition of more ATVC Driver Amplifier Boxes. This impact is
substantial, but it is not an important configuration discriminator.
Evaluation
Evaluation Discriminators
Degree of Aerodynamic Stability (AS)
First Bending Mode Frequency (BF)
Parameters
Booster Length and Diameter
LOX Fwd/Aft
Pump/Pressure Feed
Procedure
1. From drawings obtain lengths of the five candidates and location of LOX tanks.
. Using the "View from Mar" (SWAG) technique visualize changes away from the
reference configuration (STS with SRB's) on mass distribution, stiffiaess, center of
pressure, and center of gravity.
3. Rank each configuration for each discriminator, where rank 1 -- 5 implies best to worst.
Groundrules and Assumptions
I. Tank length parameter is more influential on the two discriminators than tank diameters.
2. Booster mass centers for the reference configuration are near the composite mass center.
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3. Redistributingboostermassaway from compositemass center will lower f'trst bending
mode frequency.
4. LOX tank forward or aft will have similar impact on B F in detailing away from the
reference, for the same tank lenmh.
5. Longer tank implies lower BF, but more so for LOX tank forward than for LOX tank aft.
6. LOX tank forward has stiffer fuel tank implying higher BF.
7. Pressure-fed configuration (#5) has thicker tank walls and hence will have highest BF.
8. For LOX tank forward a length increase moves the C.G. forward faster than the C.P.,
hence longer is better in this case.
9. For LOX tank aft a length increase moves the C.P. forward faster than the C.G., hence
19n_er i8 worse for this case.
Discriminator Ranking
The above "Partial Derivatives" are now manipulated in Table 1 below to arrive at separate
rankings for each discriminator.
Table 1 - Parameters and Sensitives
Config Description 1 (Ft) LOX Pos AS(Rank) BF(Rartk) FCS(Rank)
1 SSME 193 Fwd 1 3 1
2 F-1 172 Aft 4 5 5
3 NE LO_..,H_ 188 Fwd 2 2 2
4 NE LO_,P- 1 163 Aft 3 4 4
5 PF LO_,P- 1 175 Aft 5 1 3
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Rationale
The discriminator rankings in Table 1 are determined via the following lines of reasoning:
Aerodynamic Stability (AS)
1. More is better
2. LOX FW'D superior over LOX AFT for all other combinations of parameters
3. Configurations 1 & 3 have LOX forward
4. Assumption #8 states that longer is better implying that configuration 1 ranks flu'st and 3
ranks second
5. Of the remaining three configurations tank length is the discriminator as per assumption
#9, yielding:
4
2
5
Rank
3
4
5
First Bending Mode Frequency (BID
1.
2.
3.
,
Higher is better
From assumptions #5 and #7 we conclude that configuration 5 ranks first.
Configurations with LOX fwd (l&3) also have longer length, implying lower BF accor-
ding to assumption #5. This is offset by assumption #6 (stiffer fuel tank walls) when
commparing these two configurations with the remaining configurations (2 & 4).
Presuming the impact of assumption #6 is greater than that of assumption #5, we rank
configurations 1 & 3 above 2 & 4, and use relative length as the tiebreaker, yielding.
Rank Config.
2 3
3 1
4 4
5 2
Ascent Flight Control Impact
As would be expected ranking order does not coincide for the two discriminators. Since there is
no "absolute" quantitative data the direct application of weighing factors is not deemed appropri-
ate. However, with some subjective reasoning and weighing the order shown in the irma/column
of Table 1, above, was chosen.
4O
Lift-off Transient Investigation
General Dynamics' "Liquid Booster Study, Volume 1, Executive Summary" states that substan-
tial factors work needs to be done on the lift-off release system. This investigation was indicated
with the goal of combining a post t_sLe_impact with a partial rank impact to see how far up the
"thrustcurve" an explosive release system can be delayed beyond T/W = 1 before limit load of
"Booster/E'r" thrust fittings are exceeded. It is a trade-off between current SRB practice if "step
thrust rise slope" with no delay, compared with "much shallowed thrust rise slope" with some
delay. The objective is to see if we can allow the booster engines to attain somewhere near 90%
thrust level before explosive release of Shuttle from the pad. There may be some advantages in
staying with the current shuttle explosive release system rather than "changing out" to a "slow
release" (extended metal) system.
After some preliminary analysis, a computation was made for launch pad release at 87% full
thrust level. This resulted in loads very slightly exceeding (1.2%) the design limit loads of the
thrust fittings. An 86% level of thrust at release would undoubtedly result in loading with in the
design limit loads of the fittings.
If the performance of the engines can be assessed by the time the engines reach the "mid-80"
percent level, then explosive (sudden) release from the launch pad appears to be satisfactory.
Time ran out to develop transfer function and resulting of the "skin-stringer" design. Response
was generated for the monocoque design only.
Study Description
The GD LO2/LH2 18 ft. diameter liquid booster was examined both the "monocoque" version
and the "skin-stringer" version. The monocoque version was found to have the same frequency
characteristics as the present SRB Shuttle configuration, i.e. 19 I-Iz longitudinal frequency for the
pair of booster and 4 I-Iz longitudinal frequency for the lumped "orbiter/ET" mass. The "skin-
stringer" design has frequencies of 14 Hz/3 Hz, respectively.
Figure I are the computations of weights, load levels and stiffnesses of the boosters. Figure 2 is
examination of these load levels with thrust rise slope and roll over of the "helium spin" engines
(page 5-12, GD Volume ]I final report). Examination of vehicle configuration, led to the inputs
for frequency determination.
Figure 4 is the same type data for the current SRB Shuttle configuration for comparison. Since
the monocoque version of the GD LRB had the same frequencies as the SRB, the SRB transfer
function was used (figure 5). The response nature of this transfer function has been previously
given to General Dynamics. It is shown as figure 6 here, with the magnitude points "V", "W",
"X", "Y", and "Z" labeled. These are the points around the high load point "X". This plot
(figure 6) is the average of the first five shuttle flights.
The five labeled points were investigated for "step" input, and are plotted on figure 7. Looking
back to figure 2 and the computation on figure 7, it is seen that about 78% of thrust level is all
that can be tolerated and not exceed E'r thrust fitting (and back-up structure) design limit load.
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LRB Effect on Shuttle Heating
The effects on the Space Shuttle elements of replacing the Solid Rocket Booster, SRB, with
Liquid Rocket Boosters, LRB, has been investigated for the aerodynamics heating impact. The
various options offered by General Dynamics Space Division were reviewed as to the effect of
the different lengths of the LRB's on the ET forebody and the Orbiter base regions.
External Tank (ET) Forebody
An assessment of the heating impact was made by comparing the proposed heating with the
baseline design values. Figure I shows a distribution of the maximum heating rates that are used
for the baseline ET TPS on the ET ogive and intertank regions. (Figure 2 identifies these
regions). The magnitude of the heating rates dictate the type of TPS. Because an inch of
insulation material, SOFI, is required to insulate the tank from ice formation while the vehicle is
on the pad, it was decided to also use the SOFI as the TPS. Characteristics of this material are
such that at heating rates above 8 to l0 Btu/&-sec, SOFI is assumed to have ablated off of the
structure. Therefore, at higher heating rates, Super Light Ablator (SLA) is used which can
withstand heating rates up to 30 Btu/ft_-sec. Figure 3 illustrates the ET TPS.
Examination of Figure 1 shows two regions of high heating on the forward ET. The heating near
X/L of 0 is a result of the shock from the 30°/10 ° conical tip onto the ogive and the heating on
the intertank is the result of two influences. The first is from the shock off of the SRB which
impinges on the ET between an X/L of 0.28 to 0.30. The second is due to protuberance heating
around the ET/SRB attach point at X/L of 0.357. On the intertank, the high heating can be
accommodated with the massive intertank structure. Note on Figure 1 that the tip of the SRB is
opposite the ET X/L of 0.225 and the shock impinges a delta distance downstream of 0.055 to
0.075 which corresponds to a distance of 8.5 to 11.5 feet. The shock impingement increases the
heating by a factor of four whereas the shock off of the ET tip onto the forward ogive is a factor
of approximately two. In an effort to illustrate the impact of a longer LRb whose nose is forward
of the baseline SRB, the design heating values have been increased by a factor of four. In order
to not exceed the allowable 30 Btu/&-sec for SLA, (whose interface occurs at X/L of 0.04) the
forward movement curve suggests that the LRB nose tip should not be more than 1.5 to 5.4 feet
ahead of the ET. This assumes that the shock impingement is still 8.5 to 11.5 feet aft of the LRB
nose tip. There are ablators with higher heating rate capability such as MA-25S which is heavier
than SLA but can take heating rates up to 75 Btu/fta-sec.
Orbiter Base Regions
There are many variables associated with the prediction of plume radiative heating rates. Factors
such as chamber pressure, nozzle exit area, type of fuel and oxidizer, turbulent exhaust afterburn
and view factor are required to be known in order to determine the plume shape and the radiative
environment. Using the Shuttle predictions as a calibration and consulting with several experts,
it was decided that the LRB's would produce less radiation than the SRB's with some estimates
as much as 50 percent less. For this study, it is recommended that 30 percent less radiation be
assumed.
Examination of Option 9 with the three vertical nozzles, reveals that the LRB nozzle is approxi-
mately 5 feet closer to the Orbiter body flap trailing edge than the baseline SRB nozzle; that is,
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15feet asopposedto 20 feet, based on scaling option 9 and option 1 drawings with the simplify-
hag assumption that radiation is a function of the distance squared, option 9 would produce
approximately 56 percent higher heating than option 1. However, the resultant effect is only a 9
percent increase to the Orbiter Body flap trailing edge baseline. This is illustrated in Figure 4
which shows the predicted heating rate to the trailing edge for the baseline and for the LRB's.
The curve labeled "SRB Radiation" is the current design value for the SRB radiative heating
component of the total heating to the body flap. (The SSME + SRB Radiation is the total.) The
bottom long-dash curve is the assumed 30 percent reduced radiative heating of the LRB plume tO
the trailing edge and the "option 9 LRB" curve is the 56 percent increase to the LRB radiation.
Because the LRB's would lack liner material and residual solid propellant particles, they would
not exhibit the high shutdown spike that the SRB's produce at separation.
The option 9 drawing suggests that the nozzles are touching each other. If they are to be
gimballed and are spaced, then the upper nozzle would be nearer to the Orbiter with a resultant
higher radiative heating to the trailing edge. The present maximum heating rate shown of the
total SSME plus option 9 LRB is around 25 Btag&-sec. This corresponds to a radiation
equilibrium temperature of 2350°F. While the current TPS on the trailing edge can take 2300°F
for 100 reuses and around 2600°F for one use, it is recommended that the option 9 study be
judicious in establishing its proximity to _¢ body flap.
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LRB Separation
A preliminary analysis of LRB Separation was performed'to evaluate their impact on the
separation system. The conditions that were examined consisted of nominal separation along
with aborts at 100 and 75 seconds. Four I2L8 configurations were examined. They were
LOX/LH2, LOX/RP1 pressure fed, LOX/RP1 pump fed, and LOX/CH4. In general, the nominal
separation conditions did not pose a problem for any of the LRB configurations. An off-nominal
case was tun for all of the configurations. The conditions for this case were as follows:
Alpha=Beta- 10 degrees, roll, pitch, yaw rate -- 5,2,2 degrees/sec.
A pictorial presentation of the LOX/LH2 booster separation for the above conditions is presented
in Figure xx. The LOX/RP1 pressure fed booster was the only one that had a problem with this
design point. Due to the heavier weight of the pressure fed booster and the location of its center
of gravity, it required additional thrust for a clean separation.
Only the LOX/I,H2 configuration was studied for the abort conditions. There are several
problems that affect abort separations. They are the increased weight of the vehicle, the center
of gravity is farther forward, and the dynamic pressure is considerably larger than normal. These
problems tend to make separation difficult for aborts. Compounding the problem is the fact that
the proximity aerodynamic flowfield for the boosters is completely different from the nominal
separation environment. For an abort at 100 seconds the thrust on the booster separation motors
would have to be increased approximately 25 to 50%. At 75 seconds the center of gravity is so
far forward that it is difficult to rotate the LRB nose away from the External Tank. It was found
that the forward thrust would have to be increased by 100 to 150% to have any chance at a
successful separation.
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Liquid Rocket Boosters Effect of Increased Length and Diameter
Studies were made of possible Liquid Rocket Booster lengths and diameters to identify
constraints which would prevent increases in wing loading due to aerodynamic flow distortions.
The following charts show the findings of these studies.
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Introduction
The Liquid Rocket Booster study conducted by The Space Systems Division of General
Dynamics Corporation was intended to identify concepts for Liquid Rockets to replace the
current NSTS Solid Rocket Boosters with minimum impact to the on-going Shuttle Program and
increased reliability and performance capability. Additional objectives of the study were to
provide pressure fed propulsion system concepts for consideration and to provide baseline data
for potential ALS or Stand-Alone booster configurations.
Eagle Engineering, Inc. provided technical support to General Dynamics during this study. A set
of specific tasks were identified to be completed by Eagle. As the study progressed the effort
was re-oriented to satisfy the demands of changing groundrules. The data in this report reflects
activity under the original task arrangement and the revised groundrules. Significant support
was also provided to General Dynamics in development of the LRB integration plan.
Task 1 Summary Report
Task i of the STS Liquid Rocket Booster (LRB) study required Eagle Engineering, Inc. to
supply current data relative to the Space Shuttle vehicle and systems affected by an LRB
substitution.
The material transmitted consisted of selected data from NASA documents including the Space
Shuttle Flight and Ground Systems Specification (JSC 07700, Vol. X), the Shuttle Operational
Data Book (SD73-SH-01801i), and Interface Control Documents, as well as other NASA
documents and records.
Table 1 lists those data products which were subraitted individually due either to General
Dynamics specific request or in compliance with the basic requirement. Much of this material
was extracted from the Systems Integration Review (SIR), and Ascent Flight Systems Integra-
tion Review (AFSIG) meeting minutes and presentation material, as well as various other
SOUrCeS.
Table II lists those data products applicable to SRB/LRB that were part of the return to flight
Design Certification Review (DCR) being conducted to certify the Shuttle System for resuming
the flight program.
This task was extended to provide data products as the need arose.
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DataTransmittals to GDSS
Liquid RocketBoosterStudy
Table I
Item
LRB Studies, Shuttle Constraints Summary (Huntsville)
JSC 07700 SRB requirements and applicability to LRB
JSC critical design review data relative to crew escape
STS-26 trajectory design data package
Reference mission descriptions and related configuration and performance data
WTR PRM-4 baseline trajectory groundrules
STS-51-L fluids budget, weight and C.G. data
LRB effect of increased length and diameter on orbiter loads
Action item: Booster aerodynamics and flight to wind tunnel comparison
SSME POGO suppressor information
Eagle report 86-150 - SSME Startup Transient at .WTR
LRB heating data and STS-26 abort planning
Shuttle ascent key events from STS 61C
Design issues - review comments
SSME ignition timing and propellant usage data
Ascent abort gaps from STS 5, 6, & 9
LRB heating data
Abort boundaries STS 4 & 5
Intact abort windows
NSTS aerodynamics co-efficients (Hard copy and floppy disk)
10-14-87
i0-30-87
I1-05-87
I1-09-87
I1-09-87
I1-09-87
I1-09-87
II-16-87
ii-16-87
II-16-87
Ii-16-87
II-17-87
II-19-87
I1-19-87
11-20-87
I1-23-87
l1-23-77
I1-25-87
I1-25-87
I1-25-87
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Table I (Cont.)
LRB Constraints Data Book
SRB/Shuttle/ET Longitudinal Aerodynamics
Hold down post deflections
DCR material (see separate list)
Orbiter/ET ICD, STS ICD-2-12001
SRB/ET ICD, STS ICD-2-24001
Relative Impact of LRB Candidates on FLight Control
11-30-87
12-01-87
12-14-87
01-08-88
01-13-88
01-13-88
02-25-88
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Design Certification Review Transmittals
Liquid Rocket Booster Study
Table 11
STS 84-0575 Space Shuttle IVBC-3
Aerodynamic Heating Data Book, SRB-Ascent, May 24, 1984.
STS 84-0;259 IVBC-3: SRB Plume Heating Data Book, October 1984.
STS 82-0570 Space Shuttle System, SRB Separation Verification for Operations,
November 1982.
SD 74-SH-0144E Space Shuttle Program Thermal Interfaces Design Data Book IVBC-3,
preliminary copy, September 1987.
SD 73-SH-0178 Space Shuttle Flight Systems Performance Data Book, Volume 1 C -
ascent, SDM Baseline, December 1975.
STS 84-0044 Integrated Vehicle Baseline Characterization (IVBC-3), Ascent GN&C
Summary Report, Volume 1: Basic & Appendixes A through D; and
Volume 2: Appendixes E & F, April 1984.
Transmittal of IVBC-3 Roll Maneuver Limit Loads for Steel Case SRB's.
IVBC-3 and FWC (Filament Wound Case), Cycle 3, Orbiter High Q Loads, Revision D.
Transmittal of Revised IVBC-3 and Filament Wound Case (FWC), Cycle 3, External Tank and
Solid Rocket Booster High Q Loads Documentation, Revision A.
Additional IVBC-3 Solid Rocket Booster High Q Loads.
Update to the Overpressure Data Book, STS 83-0540, containing:
I) 87-100 SRB lOP Environment for Pc (Max) Specification Requirements (Feb. 16, 1987),
2) 87-409 Methodology for Incorporating Pc Max. Change in SRB Ignition Overpressure
Environment (March 27, 1987).
Transmittal of Aerodynamic Data Updates to the Aerodynamics Data Book, SD72-SH-0060-2L.
Transmittal of Shuttle Liftoff Loads for VAFB Launches with Cycle 3 Filament Wound Case
Boosters (EMS 280-205-354).
Nominal Position and Maximum Excursions in X,Y, and Z Axes for Design of a Ground
Umbilical/Bottom of SRB Sldrt Interface.
Additional IVBC-3 High Q Orbiter/ET Attach Load Conditions for Orbker Assessment.
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Table II (Cont.)
SRB Time Consistent Liftoff Loads for Design Certification Review.
IVBC-3 Post High Q Loads°
Shuttle Liftoff Loads for Design Certification Review.
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Preliminary Vehicle and Facilities Impacts Assessments
and Parametric Data Generation
1.0 Introduction
The primary emphasis of the Liquid Rocket Booster (LRB) study has been to define an alternate
boost stage launch system for the Space Shuttle with enhanced safety, reliability, and perform-
ance characteristics. Additionally, the LRB must be integratable with Space Shuttle ground and
flight systems with minimum impact. The purpose of this task (Task II) therefore is to evaluate
and compare shuttle impacts of candidate LRB configuration in concert with overall trades of
analysis activity.
The initial plan included Shuttle assessments of all proposed configurations and was planned to
be completed within three months. The effort was delayed due to configuration definition and
the down-selection process occurring simultaneously. The activity was redef'med for the second
half of the study to concentrate on three selected configurations with emphasis on flight loads,
separation dynamics, and cost comparison. This report covers only the f'trst half activity.
2.0 Purpose
The purpose of this report is to provide the status of Task II through March 31, 1988. Tasks to
define the impacts of ascent flight loads, booster separation, and costs are in process and will be
included in the final report. The five configurations being assessed, (See Figure 1) are as
follows:
Principle
ConfimlratiQn Propel.lan) _ Features
1B LO2/RP-I Pressure-Fed Closest to SRB Geometric
parameters
5A LO2/LJ-I2 Pump-Fed Same propellant as current
SSME's
5D LO2/RP-1 Pump-Fed
5/ LO@/LH2 NSTS SSME
5K LO2/RP-1 Samm F-1
3.0 Summary of LRB Groundrules, Cohstraints and Design Factors
The primary groundrules utilized in assessing the impact of the LRB designs on the NSTS
vehicle, facilities, and operations are:
(1) Provide capability to launch 70000 pounds to 150 nm orbit.
(2) Provide safe abort capability with one LRB or SSME engine out with a goal to be
capable of abort to 105 nm orbit with one engine out.
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(3) Use existing NSTS constraints for maximum aerodynamic pressure, maximum gravity
forces; day-of-launch winds; launch probability; systems dispersions; flight performance
reserves; Orbiter and External Tank structural design, etc.
(4) No redesign of the Orbiter and ET thermal protection system (TPS).
(5) No redesign of the ET interface attachments.
(6) Minimum impact to Shuttle avionics and software design.
(7) Minimal changes to KSC facilities and GSE.
(8) Retain current Shuttle vehicle stability and control margins.
The primary LRB factors that must be considered in assessing these impacts are:
(t) Diameter
- Proximity and moldline effects on Orbiter and ET.
- Aeroheating impact on Orbiter and EI" thermal protection system (TPS).
- UtiliT_ation of existing ET interface struts and fittings.
- Modification requirements for the mobile launch platform (ML).
- Orbiter structural loads impacts including wing (aerodynamic effects).
(2) Length
- Aeroelastic effects.
- LRB/ET forward attach loads.
- Hight control system effects.
- Modification requirements for KSC facilities/GSE.
assembly, etc.)
(L processing handling,
(3) Number of Engines
- Thrust vector control (TVC) authority.
- Abort options.
- MLP flame hole modifications.
- Startup/shutdown sequence.
- Safety/Reliability.
- Integrated avionics requirements.
- Lift=off thrust=to-weight ratio.
(4) Mass Propei'ties
- Propellant tank arrangement.
- TVC authority.
- LRB/ET interface loads.
(5) Type of Propellant
- Performance.
- Atmosphere quality.
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Waterquality.
Plantsand animal life.
Noise/acoustics level
Handling/loading/spills.
Transportation.
Ground Handling and Loading.
4.0 LRB Impact to NSTS Ground and Flight Systems and Operations
4.1 Aerothermodynamic Evaluation of LRB Configurations
The LRB configurations were assessed to determine the impact on the heating to the baseline
shuttle system, primarily the Orbiter and ET thermal protection system (TPS). All LRB
configurations are longer than the SRB, and were evaluated by examining the location of each
LRB nose tip relative to the ET. the resultant shock impingement from the I.RB nose onto the
higher heating regions of the ET forebody was assessed for its impact on the baseline TPS. The
longer LRB's are thought to have minimal effect on the Orbiter forebody TPS. A qualitative
assessment was made of the plume effects on the base region of the Shuttle system.
Proposed changes to the Shuttle system could impact the baseline TPS design if heating rates
produced by these changes exceed the existing material capabilities. Thus, examination of the
ET TPS layout and comparisons of heating rates for the ET design with those predicted with the
LRB's were made. The majority of the tank is covered with a spray-on-foam insulator (SOFI),
which has a heating rate limit of 10 BTU/sq-ft-see. Various thicknesses are tabulated ranging
from 2.15 inches at station 371 (x/1 -- 0.024) to 1.0 inch (required to protect against ice/frost on
the pad) at station 570 (x/1 --- 13). A Super Light Ablator (SLA), which can withstand heating
rates as high as 30 BTU/sq-ft-sec, is located under the feedlines and in the forward region of the
nose which experience high heating rates fromthe shock off of the 30/10 degree conical tip. A
slightly denser spray-on-foam, NCFI, covers the ET base region.
Two assumptions were made in developing the predicted rates for the LRB's. One is that they
are attached at the same ET location as the SRB, and two, that the shock impingement distance,
which occm's approximately 0.055 to 0.075 ET body lengths aft of the SRB nose tip, forward
movement of the shock impingement location, the baseline value of the shock on the intertank is
removed. The magnitude of the protuberance effect of the attachment may be lower for the
LRB's but not felt. The high heating observed on the intertank is due to the shock from the SRB
compound by the presence of the ET/SRB attachment. However, the intertank region is
protected only with CPR due to the massive structure being able to tolerate the high heating.
Examination of Configurations 5A, 5D, and 5K show that a small region on the ET ogive would
experience heating rates that exceed the SOFI limit and would require a modification to the TPS,
such as a strip of SLA. The differences of the effect of these three concepts on the ET is small,
with Configuration 5K being the smallest. The least TPS impact would be from Configuration
lB. No SLA would be required but perhaps concepts 1B and 5A would not be an additional TPS
impact but may require a structural change to the intertank. The largest TPS impact would be
experienced with Configuration 53. The location of the nose tip is such that the shock impinges
exactly on the nose region that experiences, the high heating from the ET conical tip shock
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impingement. Thepossibility of thetwo phasescompoundingtheflow field effect resulted in a
factor of 2 differences predicted for the LRB effect peak value. If the maximum heating rate is
40 BTU per square-foot-second then an ablator, such as MA25 could replace the SLA. If the
heating rate is as high as 80 BTU per square-foot-second, this exceeds the MA25 capability of
75 and might require a major TPS modification. A change to the length would be recommended.
Only a qualitative assessment can be made of the plume environment on the base region of the
shuttle pending further definition of the concepts. A detailed analysis will be required once the
configurations are better defined. Visual inspection of the engine arrangements and associated
vehicle configuration indicate little, if any, differences would be detected among the five
concepts.
The primary factors effecting plume base heating ate: number of engines; nozzle area ratio;
combustion chamber pressure; nozzle exit location; plume radiation characteristics; and vehicle
base pressure. The environments are likely to be reduced for the LH2/LO2 propellants and
increased for the LO2/RP-1 propellants. State-of-the-art ablators are available in the event the
ET LH2 tank bulkhead requires additional thermal protection. Total vehicle base pressure must
be evaluated to assure that the selected configuration does not seriously affect convective base
heating environments. However, if the LRB engine plumes ate located to stay within the current
SRB plume boundaries at each altitude, then one could assume that the induced aerodynamic
effects on the Orbiter/ET would be similar.
In summary, the thermal examination of the LRB concepts' effect on the shuttle system
indicated Configuration 1B as having the least impact on the ET TPS, and Configuration 5J as
having the largest. The remaining three concepts, 5A, 5D and SK, would require a small strip of
ablator material, possibly SLA, to the ET ogive in order to accommodate their thermal impact.
No discriminators for the plume impact are obvious among the concepts; however, Configura-
tion 5K appears to be the least attractive.
4.2 Flight Operations Evaluation of LRB Configurations
4.2.1 Flight Rules and Procedures
The majority of flight operations impacts involve changes to flight operations procedures. With
four throtfleable engines per liquid booster, there are more possible actions to consider. New
flight rules and procedures must be developed to consider all options.
The flight rules and procedures changes for a liquid rocket booster system will be much more
significant than a typical engine modification. New flight techniques, failure modes, and
procedures for operating and managing the liquid boosters must be developed and evaluated.
Updates to the launch commit criteria and the redundant set launch sequencer must be addressed.
Abort rules must be rewritten to reflect the enhanced abort capabilities made possible by liquid
rocket boosters. New abort rules wiLl be a significant part of the new flight operations proce-
dures required.
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4.2.2 Software
New flight operations software must be developed, tested, and certified to reflect the changes
caused by solid rocket boosters. Software development for LRB's will be more extensive than
for SRB's due to more complex valves, pumps, liquid level, slosh effects, etc., and to the
increased number of engines per booster. Extensive modifications will have to be made to the
software and the software must be taken through a rigorous verification process before flight.
The control functions of liquid rocket boosters (e.g., valves, flows, pumps, temperatures,
pressures, etc.) are more complex than those of solid rocket boosters, the orbiter pre-launch, pad
switch-over and orbiter ascent phase software requirements for monitoring and controlling the
LRB's will be more complex.
Another factor contributing to increased software development is the number of LRB engines.
Four throttleable engines per booster adds to both the complexity and reliability of the STS
system. Onboard software must be developed to prevent a thrust imbalance caused by the loss or
degradation of an LRB engine.
Each of the proposed liquid rocket booster concepts all orbiter capability with loss of one LRB
engine and enhances the abort capabilities with orbiter main engine degradation. New software
must be developed to reflect these new flight capabilities and procedures. Software to throttle
LRB engines must be developed.
The larger sizes of the liquid rocket booster concept studied will produce new aerodynamic
forces and moments for which the orbiter ascent flight control software will have to compensate.
New orbiter software builds, integration, test, and extensive verification will be required
regardless which liquid rocket booster design is chosen. Software compensation for slosh in the
new I.RB tanks will have to be developed and tested.
If the liquid rocket booster has more than two controlled thrusting nozzles, then additional ascent
thrust vector control drivers will have to be implemented in the orbiter avionics. This require-
ment in turn would impose additional complexity to the orbiter's ascent flight control software.
Studies will have to be made to see if the addition of LRB throttling capability and the possibili-
ty of different LRB thrust profiles change the area over which the external tank operates.
Possible impacts of the proposed liquid rocket booster system on the Shuttle Avionics Integra-
tion Laboratory (SAIL), Shuttle simulators, Software Production Facility, System Integration
Schedule D Contract, and on the STS Operations Contract (STSOC) must be evaluated.
4.2.3 Training and Simulations
Training and simulations must be updated for flight crews and flight control operators to learn in
the new procedures required by the more complex control functions of liquid rocket boosters.
The new abort capabilities will change the nature of abort simulations, resulting in fewer Trans-
Oceanic Abort Landing (TAL) and Return to Launch Ske (RTLS) simulations and more Abort
Once Around (AOA) and Abort to Orbit (ATO) simulations. New malfunction procedures for
liquid rocket booster leaks or hardware failure must be incorporated into the simulations. The
orbiter crew must be trained to use a few new displays, monitors, and caution and wanting
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indicators,aswell as some new manual override switches. Initial hardware training costs will
include updating the displays, controls, and the caution and warning Lights in the orbiter mock-
ups, training consoles, and in the Mission procedures.
4.2.4 Payload Integration
Payload integration will not be impacted by the substitution of liquid rocket boosters if the liftoff
and ascent loads environment of the Shuttle System using liquid rocket boosters matches or is
within the present envelope of the system using solid rocket boosters. The cun'ent liftoff and
ascent loads environment is described in NSTS 07700, Volume 14, Attachment 1 (ICD-2-
1900 I). If the loads are within the present envelope, the substitution will be transparent to the
payload community.
4.2.5 Pre- and Post-Flight Analysis
Flight analysis will be required to assess impacts in several areas. Modifications will be required
throughout the entire onboard guidance system. Ascent procedures will have to be rewritten and
evaluated. The abort region determinator (ARD), which defines actual abort times based on
vehicle performance, must be expanded to accommodate the increased engine number and
complexity. Greater Abort to Orbit (ATO) capability will minimize Return to Launch Site
(RTLS) and Trans-Oceanic Abort Landing (TAL) considerations, and may eventually simplify
ascent procedures once the new software and procedures have been evaluated.
4.2.6 Real-Time Flight Control Impacts
A LR.B system would require at least one new display similar to that for the Space Shuttle main
engines. The substitution of more complex and versatile liquid rocket boosters wiU require the
addition of one new backroom booster console, specializing in the valves, flows, pumps,
temperatures, pressures, and malfunction procedures of liquid rocket boosters during pre-launch,
launch and ascent phases.
The Booster flight control position is responsible for monitoring the main propulsion system
(MPS) including the Space Shuttle main engines, external tank, and solid rocket boosters during
pre-launch, launch and ascent phases.
In switching to any of the proposed liquid booster systems, the complexity of the Booster
console operator's work will depend on the number of possible actions, and on the amount
covered by software. Also, the orbiter crew needs the capability to manually shut down the LRB
engines.
Real-time data transmitted to the ground about the liquid rocket boosters might require a
separate transmitter, located on a booster. In this case, electromagnetic interference concerns
must be checked .pre-flight. However, this small increased downlist data requirement during
ascent would have very little impact on flight control communications.
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4.3 Integrated Structural Loads and Dynamics Evaluation of LRB Configurations
4.3.1 Plume Ignition Overpressure
The primary factors effecting plume ignition overpressure on the Orbiter base heat shield are:
number of engines; thrust buildup rate; and engine ignition sequence. The orbiter heat shield
structural limit is approximately 1.3 psi. The overpressure generated by the SSME's is signifi-
candy below this limit. The overpressure generated by the SRB's exceed the 1.3 psi limit, thus
requiring overpressure control capability designed into the ground launch facilities. Although
the overpressure generated by the LRB's must be evaluated, there are several factors that
influence the magnitude of the LRB ignition overpressure which may negate the requirement for
overpressure control These are the slower thrust buildup rate, lower thrust level engines, and
the engine ignition sequence.
4.3.2 Acoustic Environment Effects
The acoustic environment generated by the LRB engines is a factor of: number of engines;
nozzle area ratio; engine operating pressure; and propellant combination. Most Shuttle payloads
are sensitive to acoustic environment. However, most payloads launched on the Shuttle are
designed to be compatible with the current Shuttle acoustic environment. Some Shuttle
hardware also has upper operating limits. Both the Orbiter SSME's and SRB's are major
sources of high acoustics, thus the combined effects must be considered. Currently, MLP high
flow capacity water spray systems control acoustic levels prior to lift-off.
Such a system will be required for the LRB; however, this does not appear to be a problem for
any of the configurations assessed. The ctttrent Shuttle experiences maximum acoustics after
lift-off at an altitude of approximately 80 feet. Test and analyses will be required to assure
acceptable environments exist or if corrective measures must be implemented. Meeting current
interface limits with payloads will be a prime consideration.
4.3.3 Vehicle Dynamics Analysis/POGO Control
The current Shuttle has a POGO suppression system. The dynamic response with the LRB win
require additional analyses/testing. Changes to the current POGO system are anticipated since
active suppression will probably be a requirement for the LRB.
4.3.4 Engine Start Sequence/Stagger Time
• The start sequence/stagger start time for the total Shuttle will have to be assessed for vehicle/
facility optimization.
4.3.5 Dynamics of LRB Separation from Shuttle
Thrust from the LRB's can be terminated or reduced, thus permitting separation from the Orbiter
at different times during flight, which was not the case with the SRB's. It will be necessary to
develop analysis and test data relating to separation characteristics of the LRB as a function of
generally different ascent scenarios including intact and contingency abort modes. This will be
16
oneof themajor systemareas that will require full recertification/reverification through test and
analyses.
4.3.6 Effect of LRB Length and Diameter on Structural Loads
The primary concern with changing the booster mold lines from the current SRB configuration is
the effect of aerodynamic loading on the Orbiter wing and Orbiter/ET attach fittings and struts
during flight through the maximum dynamic pressure regime. The results of tests conducted by
MSFC indicate that there is a significant effect on the Orbiter aerodynamics due to LRB
diameter. The diameter should be limited to 15 feet unless additional wind tunnel data is
obtained. Other observations are:
(1) Strakes should not be used as a method to permit LRB diameters greater than 15 feet
unless additional wind tunnel data is obtained.
(2) Increasing the Orbiter incidence angle is not recommended due to increased payload bay
door structural loads at negative angle-of-attack.
4.3.7 Load Factor
Due to potentially higher load factors with LRB's during first stage, the effect on ET tank
pressure loads and structural loads may require additional ascent flight constraints.
4.3.8 Pre-Launch and Lift-off Environment
The current NSTS configuration using SRB's is very sensitive to the ignition sequence. During
pre-launch operations the SSME start causes large excursions in the bending moment at the base
of the stack which is resisted at the hold-down posts. At SRB ignition and release the stack
responds to the residual moment in a manner called "twang". The twang response couples with
the rapid SRB thrust buildup response and the SRB ignition overpressure. The current ignition
sequence is designed to provide acceptable pre-launch loads and vehicle excursions without
increasing the lift-off loads.
The LRB-equipped Shuttle should provide a reduced thrust build-up and overpressure environ-
merit, but is expected to have lower sti._ess, and a higher excursion envelope. A combination
of MLP redesign and revised ignition sequence may offset the excursions, but additional
provisions may also be required.
The lower bending frequency expected will also require significant control stability analyses for
slosh damping and other concerns during the early flight phase.
Main Propulsion System Evaluation of LRB Configuration
LH2/LO2 Configuration - Engine H2 Lag at Shutdown
Unburned H2 exits the SSME after the LO2 main valve has bee closed at engine shutdown.
Some of the H2 is unburned, creating an explosion potential. A new engine for the LRB
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LH2/LO2 configuration will probably have similar characteristics. The H2 quantity for the
SSME's can be more than 150 pounds per engine. This problem is currently being assessed for
the SSME's, and may be applicable to the LRB. Potential testing and analyses may be required
to resolve this issue for the LRB.
4.4.2 LH2/LO2 Configuration - Ire-ignition H2 Purge
The SSME start sequence utilized a short H2 lead which is dumped through the engine nozzle.
Accumulation below the engine followed by ignition can cause unacceptable overpressure. A
H2 bum-off system has been implemented for the SSME's to assure an explosive accumulation
of H2 below the engines does not occur prior to engine ignition. A similar system will probably
be required for a LRB LH2/LO2 engine.
4.4.3 MPS Abort Analyses
The LR.B will restdt in a number of new options for Shuttle. Thermal/fluid analyses for some of
the abort conditions will be required to determine abort capability for both intact abort require-
ments and for enhancement of contingency abort capability.
4.5 Integrated Ground Systems Evaluation of LRB Configuration
4.5.1 MLP Modifications
Engine exhaust gas from LRB nozzles will be more diffused than SRB exhaust gases. A larger
hole in the MLP may be required for this gas flow to avoid direct impingement. Modifications
will also be required for new pad venting and work platform requirements.
4.5.2 Exhaust Trench Modifications
More study is required to determine the degree of impact.
4.5.3 Prelaunch Operations for the Engine, Intertank, and Nose Cap Volumes
Large quantities of thermally controlled N2 must be provided anytime cold and/or explosive
propellants are onboard prior to vehicle lift-off. Air (possibly warmed) must be provided to
purge the engine compartment for work crews. Systems include gas storage, gas heating, duct
transport system, and control/monitoring instrumentation. Engine controllers, and other
computers and electronic/electrical equipment generally have both low/high thermal limits, thus
creating a potentially unacceptable explosive environment. The LRB configurations having no
H2 have less of a thermal problem, thus require less heat. The explosive potential and monitor-
ing requirements are less with RP propellants than with H2. The intertank and nose cap areas are
of less concern as they are smaller volumes, and have less equipment and leak sources.
4.5.4 Prelaunch Environment
The probability of ice/frost formations on the LRB is similar to the ET. Thus the current Shuttle
ice/debris requirements for the ET will also apply to the LRB, potentially impacting LRB TPS
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designs. UninsulatedRP tanks have large circumferential temperature distribution, possibly
effecting structural response/design, plus non-uniform propellant heating with the potential for
inverse propellant thermal stratification. However, this does not appear to be a significant I..R.B
design problem.
4.5.5 Propellant Storage and Handling
A comparison of LH2 and RP propellant storage and handling characteristics at KSC is not
completed. However, there appears to be very little difference in activating either. The primary
advantages of RP propellants over LH2 are that no bum pond or vacuum jacketed lines are
required, and is generaLly less complex to handle. Also, RP propellants can be loaded prior to
flight day and require no helium tank purge.
4.5.6 Ground/Vehicle System for Propellant Tank Pressurization Prior to Engine Start
The Shuttle vehicle LH2, LH2, and RP propellant tanks for a pressure-fed LRB configuration
will require pressurization prior to engine start. This will probably be accomplished with helium
or nitrogen. The current ground helium system for supplying the Orbiter will probably be
inadequate to meet LRB requirements. An interface with the onboard and ground for this system
will be a new requirement since this interface does not exist for the current configuration.
4.5.7 MLP Holddown Release Mechanism
The holddown release mechanism and associated systems will have to be modified to incorpo-
rate new LRB requirements. These are primarily modified to incorporate new LRB requirements.
These are primarily associated with the requirement to delay release until the health of all of the
LRB engines has been verified, and the communication of these data to the Orbiter/ground
controller. Additional studies are required to determine the optimum release procedure.
4.5.8 Pneumatic Supply
The LRB wiLl increase the requirements for pressurized helium and nitrogen for various engine
seal and cavity purges; valve actuation systems; and various flight pressurant gases. The
capability of the current system will probably have to be increased to meet these requirements.
Also, provisions must be incorporated to provide the status of these systems to ground control
during preflight and ascent operations.
4.5.9 L02 Geysering Suppression
Gas formation in the LO2 system can result in large surges which can be highly destructive. The
critical phases are:
(1) During the initialpropellantloading priorto line/vehicle hardware chiliand before any
significantquantitiesof liquidarein thevehiclelines.
(2) Once a significant quantity of liquid is in the lines or lines and vehicle.
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The Shuttle has defined ground handling and loading procedures that prevent geysering in the
ET. This will have to be assessed for the LRB, as the problem becomes very complex during
loading, preflight and flight for multi-line vehicles with independent feed lines.
4.6 Integrated Avionics Evaluation of LRB Configurations
4.6.1 MPS Operation During Flight and Shutdown
Without adequate communication between the LRB and Orbiter to maximize performance,
flexibility, and safety, the LRB becomes little more than an SRB. Communications for flight
control existed for the SRB; however, it becomes more complex for the LRB with more engines,
engine out, and the potential for variable thrust capability. Some of the many considerations
include: vehicle control; vehicle structural loading capability; variable payload weights, various
abort capabilities, etc. Minimizing the impact to the Shuttle integrated avionics hardware and
software in utilizing these LRB features to enhance performance and safety is a key program
driver.
The DC power required by the LRB's will likely be greater than that required by the SRB's.
Power for pumps and valves to route, transport, and throttle the liquid fuel and oxidizer would be
expected to add to the power required for thrust vector control, rate gyros, range safety, etc. If
the LRB's are retained longer during the ascent phase for improved performance, the demand for
Orbiter power would be for a longer period. Dependence upon the Orbiter for DC power may be
excessive.
LRB's will require a Development Flight Instrumentation (DFI) package. FLight of the DFI
package during the development flights may impact the Orbiter payload bay volume; thus, the
payload carrying capacity. A DFI package for LRB's may be more extensive than was the SRB
DFI due to more complex valves, pumps, liquid level, slosh effects, etc. Thus, additional cables
or data multiplexing schemes may be required.
If the LRB's to be substituted for the LRB's have more than two (2) controlled thrusting nozzles,
then additional Ascent Thrust Vector Control (ATVC) drivers will have to be implemented in the
Orbiter avionics. This requirement in turn would impose additional complexity to the Orbiter
ascent flight control software. All new software will require extensive test and verification.
Substitution of LRB's with different mold lines will result in new aerodynamic forces and
moments which the Orbiter ascent flight control software will have to compensate for. Thus,
new Orbiter software builds, integration, test, and extensive verification will be required no
matter what the LRB configuration is. Software compensation for slosh in the new LRB tanks
will have to be developed, tested, etc.
Since the control functions of LRB's are more complex than SRB's, e.g., valves, flows, pumps,
temperatures, pressures, etc. the Orbiter/LPS prelaunch, pad switch-over and Orbiter ascent
phase software requirements for monitoring andcontrolling the LRB's will be more complex.
Thus, it should be expected that extensive modifications will have to be made to the software
and the software must be taken through a rigorous verification process.
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Incorporation of Built-in Test Equipment (BITE) in a replacement LRB could result in more
extensive BITE coverage due to the more complex nature of LRB's over SRB's requiring
additional Orbiter and Launch Processing System (LPS) software and its verification.
4.7 Integrated GN&CS Evaluation of LRB Configurations
4.7.1 Vehicle Control During LRB Shutdown
SRB thrust mismatch during shutdown is of significant concern to vehicle control. Normal LRB
operation during a similar time flame should be more favorable. For abnormal operations the
situation worsens. Analysis/testing is required to develop satisfactory operational methods.
4.7.2 Requirement for TVC on the LRB
In order for the LRB to integrate into the current Shuttle configuration, TVC capability on the
LRB is considered mandatory. The Orbiter design has taken advantage of weight reductions by
not being burdened with any requirements for providing control muscle during boost. The fact
that the SSME's are gimballed at all is due primarily to reduce loads in the Orbiter/ET attach
struts. The subsequent paragraphs provide the background and justification for the current SRB
requirements which can be used as a basis for establishing the TVC requirements for the selected
-LRB configuration.
The 5.0 degree SRB gimbal angle requirement was established from six degrees of freedom
dynamics simulations, using three sigma specification value of SRB thrust mismatch at tailoff,
and putting a reasonable limitation on the amount of unwanted attitude excursion that would be
tolerated. Mismatch was the main driver but also considered were thrust misalignment, Orbiter
engine out, winds, and a design goal of avoiding glmbal angle saturation. In the max q flight
phase there is a requirement for approximately 2.0 degrees of total SRB thrust trim in the pitch
plane for the sole purpose of providing the required qx bias in the mean wind condition. Adding
SRB thrust misalignment, wind shear effects, avionics failure (RM) transient, and Orbiter engine
failure transients (not all simultaneously) consumes practically all of the entire 5.0 degrees, with
practically nothing left over for linear control. Another design goal in addition to avoiding
hitting the stops due to external disturbances, was to reserve 1.0 degrees for dynamic control of
propellant slosh and to respond to attitude change command from guidance.
The 5.0 degrees per second rate requirement was established originally to provide a "bare bones"
capability for "dynamic loads suppression", an original Level II Program requirement. This
means phase stabiliTed vibration and/or slosh modes. Realizing the impracticality of this design
feature for higher order modes, due to prohibitive demand on the TVC and hydraulic systems, a
capability limit of roughly plus or minus 0.25 degrees at 3.0 Hertz was chosen. This alone
translates into the 5.0 degrees per second requirement. The 5.0 degrees per second requirement
also stems from a requirement to recover from large initial conditions on attitude and/or rate
error, since it can be viewed as a limit on vehicle angular acceleration rate (jerk). Limits on
acceleration rate in an otherwise linear second order system, produces instability beyond some
1
bound on initial conditions.
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Theseand other booster TVC requirements were established through a series of meetings of the
Ascent Flight Control Panel in 1973 and early 1974, resulting in the following set of require-
ments to be baselined:
(1) Actuator mount geometry at 45 and 135 degrees from the plane of symmetry (as opposed
to 0 to 90 degrees).
(2) Square gimbal capability pattern.
(3) Design load for actuator of 130,000 pounds.
(4) 5.0 degree usable displacement in each axis simultaneously.
(5) 5.0 degrees per second simultaneously for both actuators under full load.
(6) Minimum gimbal angle acceleration capability of 2.0 radians per second at rated load.
(7) Total duty cycle of 140 degrees per motor (read single booster thrust).
These requirements were formally transmitted to the SRB Project, from Level II, on February
12, 1974.
A word of caution on vehicle configuration. Aerodynamic moment coefficients, in a body axis
system of coordinates, is perhaps the most significant design driver on TVC requirements for
launch vehicle, i.e., the entire stack. Ideally they should be as small as possible for pure attitude
control, but in the direction of aerodynamic stability for load relief control (an Orbiter require-
ment). Moving the booster nose cones forward to gain volume would shift the center of pressure
forward, and locating the oxidizer tank aft of the _el tank would move the center of gravity aft.
Both of these effects will tend to increase the TVC requirements and complicate the intricate
interaction between flight control and structural loads.
4.8 LRB Cost Impacts Assessments
Relative cost impacts to the NSTS systems of incorporating various configurations using a
variety of propellant combinations, engine packages, and geometries was completed in the ftrst
half of the study. Development of cost models and estimates of the cost impacts for flight
software, test hardware, and operational spares will be completed and reported in the final report.
Operations cost estimates will also be completed using an Eagle modified version of the KSC
Operations Cost Model. The model will provide estimates of a range of traffic models using
variable assumptions.
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Task lYI of the STS Liquid Rocket (LRB) study required Eagle Engineering, Inc. to develop
design guidelines and requirements to minimize impacts to the Space Shuttle system from an
LRB substitution.
Five potential liquid rocket booster configurations were assessed in this phase of the liquid
rocket booster study. These configurations consist of one pump fed system using modified
existing Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSMEs), one pump fed system using modified existing
Saturn F-1 engines, two newly designed pump fed engine concepts using LO2/LH2 or LO2/RP-1
fuels, and one pressure fed system using LO2/RP-1. The following lists the liquid rocket booster
concepts:
.Configuration _
1B LO2/RP-1 Pressure-Fed
5A LO2/L/-t2 Pump-Fed
SD LO2/RP-I Pump-Fed
5J LO2AA-I2 NSTS SSME
5K LO2/RP-1 Saturn F-1
The first four configurations have 4 engines per liquid rocket booster, while configuration 5K
has 2 engines per LRB. Each of the liquid rocket booster concepts considered is capable of
lifting a 70 Klb payload to 150 n mi orbit. 28.5 degrees inclination with orbiter SSME's limited
to 100 percent PL. The boosters must also be capable of lifting a 59 Klb payload to 150 n mi
orbit, 28.5 degrees inclination, with orbiter SSME's limited to 104 percent PL. Avionics and
power systems were assumed to be common to all concepts.
The design guidelines and requirements to minimize impacts to the Space Shuttle system for
these five liquid rocket booster configurations are as follows:
The primary design guidelines and requirements of a liquid rocket booster system reflect the first
order selection criteria.
Improved safety is a prime reason for considering liquid rocket boosters as potential solid
booster replacements. Liquid rocket boosters should be designed with safety enhancements,
such as the capability for intact aborts with one LRB engine out at lift-off, and possible enhanced
orbit capability with degradation or loss of a Space Shuttle main engine.
Improved environmental acceptability is another advantage of liquid rocket boosters over solids.
Liquid rocket booster designs improve the hazardous near field acid cloud produced by solid
boosters. Liquid rocket boosters also prevent the destraction of the ozone layer caused by the
combustion of solids.
Other goals of the liquid rocket booster program include Space Transportation System (STS)
integration with minimum impact to the STS and launch site. Liquid rocket booster concepts
were developed to minimize impacts to the orbiter, external tank, launch site, and ground support
equipment.
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Liquid rocketboosterreliability is alsoof prime concern. Since the control functions of liquid
rocket boosters (e.g., valves, flows, pumps, temperatures, pressures, etc.) are more complex than
those of solid rocket boosters, the orbiter pre-launch, pad switch-over and orbiter ascent phase
software requirements for monitoring and controlling the LRBs will be more complex. The
greater complexity of liquids over solids requires added attention to LRB reliability.
In addition to the basic design rules and guidelines listed above, the fonowing areas must be
considered in the development of a liquid rocket booster system:
LRB Maximum Diameter
The maximum liquid rocket booster diameter shall be constrained to prevent increases in wing
loading due to aerodynamic flow distortions. The maximum allowable diameter is approximate-
ly f'_een feet. See "Liquid Rocket Boosters - Effect of Increased Length and Diameter" in the
Special Reports Summaries section for more information.
Flight Load Assessments
A key consideration to potentially upgrading the National Space Transportation System (NSTS),
by replacing the solid rocket boosters (SRB's) with liquid rocket boosters (LRB's), is to assure
development of an LRB design that is compatible with the NSTS and its associated system
design constraints. Accordingly, the effects of LRB thrust, mass property and estimated element
aerodynamic characteristics on potentially critical orbiter, external tank (El') and interface
structure were assessed throughout first stage flight for each LRB concept under study. Assess-
ments were performed using a program containing over 80 structural load indicator algorithms
that were evaluated using flight simulation trajectory parameters provided by GDSS as inputs.
Figure I presents two typical load indicators that were evaluated. The straight horizontal lines
denote the indicator structural limits while the lines with the triangular symbols correspond to
the same limits but with a 90% systems dispersion protection level included. The dotted line
depicts the predicted load indicator Mach-history for a particular LRB conceptual design (the
RP-I pressure fed booster in this case). For comparison, the solid Mach-history trace depicts the
corresponding load indicator variation that would be predicted for the NSTS using its currently
baselined solid rocket booster. As indicated, the "fwd crossbeam thrust panel" indicator shows a
significant structural exceedance for the LRB case over a large portion of the trajectory beyond
M=2. Similarly, a near-exceedance is seen for the LRB case at M=2.5 for the "crossbeam lower
chord fitting" indicator.
Our assessment of the structural load indicators generated for each of the LRB concepts studied
revealed that nearly all of the observed structural exceedances were due to excessive LRB thrust
in the high Mach number range and that these exceedances could be precluded by appropriate
LRB throttling. A recommended LRB throttle logic was developed based on constraining the
ET LOX tank aft dome head pressure indicator to its maximum allowable value of 39.2 psi (see
Figure 2). This throttle logic concept also can be adapted to protect against other LRB thrust
driven load indicator exceedances should further analysis show that the aft dome head pressure
indicator does not always represent the most critical load indicator exceedances.
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LRB Estimated Aero Characteristics Assessment
Reasonableness checks were performed on the estimated element aerodynamic characteristics
that were used to generate the LRB structural load indicator assessments. While the vast
majority of the estimated aerodynamic characteristics appeared to be quite reasonable, several
anomalies were observed regarding the increments used to convert the shuttle SRB's to
appropriate LRB designs. The anomalies concerned the lateral location of the LRB normal force
aerodynamic center and the longitudinal location of the LRB side force aerodynamic center.
Subsequently, the element aerodynamic characteristics were revised to correct the observed
anomalies. However, due to programmatic priorities, updated trajectory simulations using the
revised aerodynamics could not be generated, thus precluding a rigorous reassessment of the
load indicators. Upon request, an estimate of the effect of correcting the LRB normal force
lateral aerodynamic center was assessed (via hand calculations) relative to the aft ET/LRB
interface member loads (struts P8 through PI3). Results of the analysis indicated that only the
lower horizontal struts, P9 and PI2, would be critical and only for the LOX/H2 pump fed
concept at +2.5 ° of sideslip.
Aerothermodynamics
The impacts to the baseline shurde system, primarily the orbiter and extemal tank (ET) thermal
protection system (TPS) were studied. The shock impingement from the LRB nose onto the
higher heating regions of the ET forebody was assessed for its impact on the baseline TPS. The
longer LRB's have minimal effect on the orbiter forebody thermal protection system. With the
longer LRB's and the forward movement of the shock impingement location, the baseline value
of the shock on the intertank is removed. The magnitude of the protuberance effect of the
attachment may be lower for the LRB's. Thermal examination of the proposed liquid rocket
boosters identified configuration Ib as having the least impact on the external tank thermal
protection system, and Configuration 5J as having the largest. The remaining three concepts,
5A, 5D, and 5K, would require a small strip of ablator material to the external tank in order to
accommodate their thermal impact.
Plume Heating
An assessment was made of the plume effects on the base region of the Shuttle system. Analysis
of the plume environment of the base of the Shuttle reveals little difference among the five
configurations. Plume heating is dependent on the number of engines, nozzle area ratio,
combustion chamber pressure, nozzle exit location, plume radiation characteristics, and vehicle
base pressure. The environments are likely to be reduced for the LO2/LH2 propellants and
increased for the LO2/RP-1 propellants. Detailed plume analyses can be computed once engine
specifications are defined.
Engine Throttling
All proposed Liquid rocket booster configurations will have the capability to throttle the LRB
engines. Individual throttling capability would significantly increase the preflight analyses,
software, monitoring and controls required. Therefore it is recommended that the engines on
each booster throttle as a group.
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LRB Data Communications
Data communications for flight control becomes more complex for liquid rocket booster systems
because of more engines, various engine out or engine degradation combinations, and possible
LRB variable thrust capability. Some of the many considerations include vehicle control,
vehicle structural loading capability, variable payload weights, various abort capabilities, etc.
The new liquid rocket boosters must be designed to minimize both the hardware and software
impacts to the Shuttle integrated avionics while incorporating these capabilities to enhance
performance, flexibility, and crew and vehicle safety.
LRB TPS
The extemal environment surrounding the liquid rocket boosters may result in ice/frost forma-
tions similar to those on the external tank. The liquid rocket boosters should be designed in
accordance with Shuttle Ice/DETSRIS requirements. This design requirement may affect
proposed LRB thermal protection system (TPS) plans, possibly effecting structural response/
design plus non-uniform propellant heating with the potential for inverse propellant thermal
stratification.
Acoustic Environment
The acoustic environment generated by the liquid rocket boosters must not exceed that generated
by current solid rocket boosters (SRBs). This constraint addresses the sensitivities of payloads
and some Shuttle hardware. Acoustic studies must consider the combined effects of Space
Shuttle Main Engine and liquid rocket booster interaction.
Liquid rocket boosters will require systems to control acoustic levels prior to lift-off similar to
the water spray systems presently used with the solid rocket booster system. The liquid rocket
boosters must be designed to accommodate the maximum Shuttle acoustics levels which occur at
approximately 80 feet altitude. In-depth tests and analyses will be required on the final configu-
ration.
LRB Separation
The liquid rocket booster system should be designed to allow LRB shutdown and separation
from the Orbiter at several times during ascent, as a function of different intact abort scenarios.
The analyses and test data relating to separation characteristics of the liquid rocket boosters will
define the increased safety margins of the new Shuttle system. See "LRB Separation" in the
Special Report Summaries section for more information.
Hydrogen Burn-off
The Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) start sequence utilizes a short hydrogen lead which is
dumped through the engine nozzle. Accumulation below the engine followed by ignition can
cause unacceptable overpressure. This hydrogen must be burned before accumulation occurs. A
bum-off system for the liquid rocket boosters is needed similar to that of currently provided for
the Space Shuttle Main Engines.
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SSME Hydrogen
The new Liquid rocket booster design should be prepared to alleviate the problem of unburned
hydrogen in the Space Shuttle Main Engines after the oxygen main valve has closed at shut-
down. This issue is currently under investigation with the Shuttle using solid boosters. This
issue is important since there can be more than 150 pounds of hydrogen per SSME and this
unburned hydrogen creates an explosion potential. However, a solution found for the current
Shuttle system and associated solid rocket boosters may also apply to a Shuttle using liquid
rocket boosters.
LRB Release System
The proposed liquid rocket boosters must be designed with a hold down release mechanism and
associated system to assure that all four to eight engines have started and are producing the
required thrust. These facts must also be communicated to the orbiter and ground control. This
is not required with the present solid rocket boosters.
LRB Purges
The liquid rocket boosters must provide for hydrogen and nitrogen purges of various engine
seals and cavities, gas supply to valve actuation systems, and flight pressurant gases. These
must be provided while minimizing orbiter interface and impacts.
02 Geysering Suppression
The liquid rocket boosters shall be designed to suppress oxygen geysering in supply lines. The
gas formation in the liquid oxygen system can result in large, highly destructive surges once a
significant quantity of liquid is in the line or lines and vehicle. Analyses must be made of these
very complex effects for loading, preflight, and flight.
LRB Thrust Mismatch
The liquid rocket booster should be designed to minimize liquid rocket booster Oa'ust mismatch.
Equal amounts of thrust should be delivered from each LRB engine for optimum ascent
trajectory and to provide even thrust balances between engines during the LRB shutdown
sequence. Analysis and testing will be necessary to develop satisfactory operational methods.
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LRB Thermal Requirements
Examination of the heating to the Liquid Rocket Booster (LRB) configurations was made in
order to determine the type of Thermal Projection System (TPS) required. The LRB heating
environments were assessed relative to the Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) design
values and two options for TPS requirements are offered.
A estimate of aerodynamic heating was made by comparing proposed trajectories with a
trajectory for which heating rates have been determined. Aerodynamic heating is a function of
the square root of atmospheric density and of the velocity cubed. Thus, at the same velocity, one
need only to compare altitudes (densities) to obtain the relative values.
Altitude vs velocity of the proposed LRB trajectories and the aemheating ascent design
trajectory used for the Space Shuttle elements were submitted. All of the trajectories were very
similar until approximately 3000 f-t/see velocity when the Shuttle design trajectory begins to
deviate. At the time of peak heating, around 4000 ft/sec, the LRB trajectories are approximately
10,000 feet higher in altitude. This means the density is around 60 to 65 percent lower and the
heating is 26 to 28 percent lower than the Shuttle SRB. A review of the predicted heating for the
SRB revealed that a majority of the maximum heating rate values are 6.0 Btu/ft 2 sec or lower
with only a few exceeding 11.0 Btu's (see LRB Thermal Requirements, Figure 1).
Insulation Requirements
Because of the Space Shuttle Program requirement to minimize ice formation on the External
Tank (ET) following on-pad propellant loading to avoid ice impact on the Orbiter, a spray-on
foam insulation (SOFT) is baselined for the ET. It was found that approximately 1.0 inch
thickness of SOFI satisfies the minimum ice requirement. This particular insulation material,
identified as CPR-488, has a maximum heating rate capability of 10 to 11 Btu/ft: see and is used
as an effective TPS for ascent heating.
In light of the trajectory comparisons, k is recommended that 1.0 inch of SOH will adequately
protect the LRB cylindrical structure and no doubt the aluminum nose for the 2 shorter boosters
which ate very similar to the SRB. The 2 longer LRBs may requite additional TPS on their nose
tips since they extend just forward of the ET and may not be enveloped within the ET shock.
Cork would suffice for this additional TPS. For those regions of the LRB near feedlines or other
protuberances, a Super Light Ablator (SLA) is recommended until the design matures or ground
test data become available.
Two options for LRB TPS can be consider at this time; one for protection just past staging and
the other to pmteet the LRB for entry. In the case of a short time flight without the need to
survive entry, only SOFI would be required with a little SLA near major protuberances.
However, for the LRB to withstand entry heating, cork is recommended on the nose cone and
over protruding bolt heads, etc. and SLA near the cowlings and Lines.
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Cost Estimation
Eagle Engineering, Inc. support to General Dynamics Liquid Rocket Booster Study included the
following cost estimates:
1. Estimates for the impact of meals to the Orbiter, and other STS elements
2. Independent assessment of LRB vehicle costs
3. Estimate of the LRB software development costs
4. Definition of spares program
5. Definition of test program subsystem
6. Operations cost estimates
Cost Impact of Mods to the Orbiter and Other STS Elements
Cost estimates were developed for each of nine LRB configurations depending on several
parameters including the complexity of the LRB configuration and the number of engines. The
method of estimating was to develop percent changes in the STS systems as a function of the
LRB design and then apply these percentages to the original STS element DDT&E.
These estimates identified impacts on the Orbiter Vehicle, primarily in the Avionics systems,
impacts to the Flight Software, impacts on the Systems Engineering budgets, the MSFC projects
including the External Tank and the MSFC Systems budgets. The total program costs on all STS
program elements except KSC were estimated due to the modifications required to substitute an
LRB for the Solid Rocket Boosters.
LRB Vehicle Costs
This exercise was conducted in support of the General Dynamics cost estimating team and
consisted of EEI developing an independent parametric estimate of each of several LRB
configurations based on the LRB subsystem level weight statement and complexity judgments
from the EEI engineering staff. The result of this was for the customer to revise certain of his
estimates and to develop more rationale in some areas that lacked technical definition. The
conclusion that the GDSS Cost Estimating Relationships were comparable in several areas to the
EEl CEILs. Another result was that the data being supplied by the Engine manufacturers was
substantially lower than what the CER estimate of engine development indicated.
Estimate of LRB Software Development Costs
In support of the GDSS cost estimating team, EEl developed an estimate for the Flight Software
for the LRB. This estimate was developed based on the size of the LRB computer memory, the
number of lines of code required to program the memory and the cost software programming per
line of code. The estimate was essentially accepted by the customer and his customer as a
reasonable software estimate.
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Definition of SparesProgram
Another EEI task was the definition of the Spares program and the cost of the program. This
task was accomplished by estimating the initial spares requirement the initial spares laying-by
reviewing the assumptions regarding vehicle checkout, production rates and availability. Based
on these assumptions, and the EEI knowledge of the vehicle assembly and launch sequence, an
initial spares requirement was developed which would allow the program to proceed without any
delays due to availability of spares. However, not expending large sums of money for compo-
nents that either would not be spared, such as structure, or would be available from the next
vehicle in the production line. In addition, the EEl concept allowed for the time that the vehicle
was in the VAB and on the launch pad, and certain elements would have to be replaced in a
timely manner. This analysis allowed EEl to develop an initial spares requirement. The second
part of this task involved estimating the operational spares requirement once the initial spares
laying was established. This was again estimated assuming a "piggy back" spares concept with a
probability of sufficiency (POS) of 85 to 90 percent. Once the spares requirement is established,
then the cost is estimated based on subsystem and LRU costs.
Definition of Test Program
This EEl task consisted of two elements. First was the estimate by subsystem of the test
hardware requirements. These estimates were developed by examining each LRB subsystem
such as structure, avionics, TVC and other and making an engineering judgement of what tests
were required for those individual subsystems. After developing the test requirements for
subsystem development, qualification and certification, EEI converted these into equivalent
subsystems and then a cost estimate was developed based on the cost of the individual subsys-
tem. Second, the integrated test program requirements were developed based on developing
analogies between the LRB engine programs and the Space Shuttle Main Engine integrated test
program conducted at NSTL. For example it was felt that an integrated test program such as the
STS Main Propulsion Test Program (MPTA) would be required. This test program was not for
the engines alone rather for the total integrated LRB vehicle. In addition, a series of tests were
defined based on the EEI technical knowledge of the test requirements.
Operations Cost Estimates
Eagle Engineering had the task to develop the total Operations cost estimates for the LRB
program including facilities cost estimates, launch cost estimates and sustaining manpower cost
estimates. As part of this task, the KSC launch operations cost model was obtained from KSC
personnel and modified to fit the LRB program.
First, the facility requirements were developed based on the study done by the Shuttle Processing
Contractor in support of the LRB study. Using the parameters from the KSC launch operations
cost model, the price of the new facilities was developed. This estimate was broken into R&D
and C of F in order that the customer could differentiate between budgets.
Second, the launch operations costs were estimated, again utilizing the modified KSC launch
operations model. This model uses vehicle parameters, mission models, technology and several
other parameters to estimate the total launch operations costs. EEl then took this output and
separated out costs that would not be chargeable to the LRB program, such as R & PM costs like
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utilities and security, and developedthe EEl estimate of the LRB launch operations costs
assuming certain variable costs per launch and certain other costs such as fzxed launch opera-
tions manpower.
Third, EEl presented this analysis to GDSS showing the total launch operations cost per flight,
cost per lb. of payload in orbit and total fixed and variable manpower.
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Flight Control Impact of LRB Candidates
The subject comparison has been performed for the Ascent Flight Control discipline. The five
configurations examined are identified below. They are:
Pump Fed
Existing Engines: SSME 1
F-I 2
New Engines: LO2/LH2 3
LO2/RP1 4
Pressure Fed LO2/RP1 5
The statement of work requested an evaluation of changes required for each, in both the pre-
launch and ascent environments. Also, supply supporting rationale, and rank in order of impact.
In the Ascent Flight Control System area the major discriminators appear to be as follows:
A* Number of engines
Number of TVC drivers required (four per actuator X 2 per engine)
Liftoff T/W with one engine out (impacts tower clearance margins)
B. Length of Booster
C°
Aerodynamic stability (longer booster moves CP forward)
Lowest bending mode frequency (longer boosters tend to imply lower frequen-
cies, all else-equal)
LOX Tank forward or aft
Aerodynamic stability
(LOX Tank forward is a dramatic improvement)
Stiffness
(LOX Tank forward requires higher load bearing fuel tank skin -- stiffer)
D. Pressure fed or pump - Pressure fed requires thick tank walls -- stiffer
The above categorization of discriminators are in the obvious differences between the configura-
tions. Notice that they all are evaluated by a different set of discriminators, these being:
A. Avionics impact (#TVC servo valve driver amplifiers)
B. Lifioff T/W with engine out
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C. Degreeof Aerodynamic Stability
D. Lowest First Bending mode frequency
Let us eliminate the rust two from this list, since they provide absolutely no discrimination
between four of the five configurations and have offsetting virtues for the remaining configura-
tion (F-1 engines). This leaves only two major discriminators for the evaluation.
Before doing the actual evaluation, which is the latter part of the task, we address the first part,
i.e. changes required for pre-launch and ascent phases. In the prelaunch phase there would be
changes to the gimbal test program and its pertinent "Launch Commit Criteria". In the ascent
phase there would be changes in FCS fdter coefficients, loop gains, trim profiles, discreets, and
guidance tables. For the most part this would entail changes of existing software parameters (all
of which are not "I-Load") with very little actual software structure changes. There is an
avionics hardware impact for addition of more ATVC Driver Amplifier Boxes. This impact is
substantial, but it is not an important configuration discriminator.
Evaluation
Evaluation Discriminators
Degree of Aerodynamic Stability (AS)
First Bending Mode Frequency (BF)
Parameters
Booster Length and Diameter
LOX Fwd/Aft
Pump/Pressure Feed
Procedure
1. From drawings obtain lengths of the five candidates and location of LOX tanks.
. Using the "View from Afar" (SWAG) technique visualize changes away from the
reference configuration (STS with SRB's) on mass distribution, stiffrtess, center of
pressure, and center of gravity.
3. Rank each configuration for each discriminator, where rank 1 -- 5 implies best to worst.
Groundrules and Assumptions
1. Tank length parameter is more influential on the two discriminators than tank diameters.
2. Booster mass centers for the reference configuration are near the composite mass center.
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3. Redistributing booster mass away from composite mass center will lower fin'st bending
mode frequency.
4. LOX tank forward or aft will have similar impact on BF in detailing away from the
reference, for the same tank lenmh.
5. Longer tank implies lower BF, but more so for LOX tank forward than for LOX tank aft.
6. LOX tank forward has stiffer fuel tank implying higher BF.
7. Pressure-fed configuration (#5) has thicker tank walls and hence will have highest BF.
8. For LOX tank forward a length increase moves the C.G. forward faster than the C.P.,
hence 19nger is better in this case.
9. For LOX tank aft a length increase moves the C.P. forward faster than the C.G., hence
longer is worse for this case.
Discriminator Ranking
The above "Partial Derivatives" are now manipulated in Table 1 below to arrive at separate
rankings for each discriminator.
Table I - Paramcters and Sensitives
Config Description 1 (Ft) LOX Pos AS(Rank) BFCRank) FCS(Rank)
1 SSME 193 Fwd 1 3 1
2 F-1 172 Aft 4 S 5
3 NE LO)/LH2 188 Fwd 2 2 2
4 NE LO)/RP- 1 163 Aft 3 4 4
5 PF LO_/RP- 1 175 Aft S 1 3
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Rationale
The discriminator rankings in Table 1 are determined via the following lines of reasoning:
Aerodynamic Stability (AS)
1. More is better
2. LOX FWD superior over LOX AFT for all other combinations of parameters
3. Configurations I & 3 have LOX forward
Q Assumption #8 states that longer is better implying that configuration 1 ranks first and 3
ranks second
. Of the remaining three configurations tank length is the discriminator as per assumption
#9, yielding:
Rank
3 4
4 2
5 5
First Bending Mode Frequency (BF)
1. Higher is better
2. From assumptions #5 and #7 we conclude that configuration 5 ranks first.
. Configurations with LOX fwd (l&3) also have longer length, implying lower BF accor-
ding to assumption #5. This is offset by assumption #6 (stiffer fuel tank walls) when
commparing these two configurations with the remaining configurations (2 & 4).
, Presuming the impact of assumption #6 is greater than that of assumption #5, we rank
configurations 1 & 3 above 2 & 4, and use relative length as the tiebreaker, yielding.
Rank Config.
2 3
3 I
4 4
5 2
Ascent Flight Control Impact
As would be expected ranking order does not coincide for the two discriminators. Since there is
no "absolute" quantitative data the direct application of weighing factors is not deemed appropri-
ate. However, with some subjective reasoning and weighing the order shown in the final column
of Table 1, above, was chosen.
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LRB Effect on Shuttle Heating
The effects on the Space Shuttle elements of replacing the Solid Rocket Booster, SRB, with
Liquid Rocket Boosters, LRB, has been investigated for the aerodynamics heating impact. The
various options offered by General Dynamics Space Division were reviewed as to the effect of
the different lengths of the I..RB's on the ET forebody and the Orbiter base regions.
External Tank (El') Forebody
An assessment of the heating impact was made by comparing the proposed heating with the
baseline design values. Figure I shows a distribution of the maximum heating rates that are used
for the baseline ET TPS on the El" ogive and intertank regions. (Figure 2 identifies these
regions). The magnitude of the heating rates dictate the type of TPS. Because an inch of
insulation material, SOFI, is required to insulate the tank from ice formation while the vehicle is
on the pad, it was decided to also use the SOH as the TPS. Characteristics of this material are
such that at heating rates above 8 to 10 Btu/ft_-sec, SOFI is assumed to have ablated off of the
structure. Therefore, at higher heating rates, Super Light Ablator (SLA) is used which can
withstand heating rates up to 30 Btu/W-sec. Figure 3 illustrates the ET TPS.
Examination of Figure 1 shows two regions of high heating on the forward ET. The heating near
X/L of 0 is a result of the shock from the 30°/10 ° conical tip onto the ogive and the heating on
the intertank is the result of two influences. The first is from the shock off of the SRB which
impinges on the ET between an Xfl_.. of 0.28 to 0.30. The second is due to protuberance heating
around the ET/SRB attach point at X/L of 0.357. On the intertank, the high heating can be
accommodated with the massive intertank structure. Note on Figure 1 that the tip of the SRB is
opposite the El" X/L of 0.225 and the shock impinges a delta distance downstream of 0.055 to
0.075 which corresponds to a distance of 8.5 to 11.5 feet. The shock impingement increases the
heating by a factor of four whereas the shock off of the El" tip onto the forward ogive is a factor
of approximately two. In an effort to illustrate the impact of a Ionger LRb whose nose is forward
of the baseline SRB, the design heating values have been increased by a factor of four. In order
to not exceed the allowable 30 Btu/fP-sec for SLA, (whose interface occurs at X/L of 0.04) the
forward movement curve suggests that the LRB nose tip should not be more than 1.5 to 5.4 feet
ahead of the ET. This assumes thai the shock impingement is still 8.5 to 11.5 feet aft of the LRB
nose tip. There are ablators with higher heating rate capabRity such as MA-25S which is heavier
than SLA but can take heating rates up to 75 Btu_-sec.
Orbiter Base Regions
There axe many variables associated with the prediction of plume radiative heating rates. Factors
such as chamber pressure, nozzle exit area, type of fuel and oxidizer, turbulent exhaust afterbum
and view factor are required to be known in order to determine the plume shape and the radiative
environment. Using the Shuttle predictions as a calibration and consulting with several experts,
it was decided that the LRB's would produce less radiation than the SRB's with some estimates
as much as 50 percent less. For this study, it is recommended that 30 percent less radiation be
assumed.
Examination of Option 9 with the three vertical nozzles, reveals that the LKB nozzle is approxi-
mately 5 feet closer to the Orbiter body flap trailing edge than the baseline SRB nozzle; that is,
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15 feet as opposed to 20 feet, based on scaling option 9 and option 1 drawings with the simplify-
ing assumption that radiation is a function of the distance squared, option 9 would produce
approximately 56 percent higher heating than option 1. However, the resultant effect is only a 9
percent increase to the Orbiter Body flap trailing edge baseline. This is illustrated in Figure 4
which shows the predicted heating rate to the trailing edge for the baseline and for the LRB's.
The curve labeled "SRB Radiation" is the current design value for the SRB radiative heating
component of the total heating to the body flap. (The SSME + SRB Radiation is the total.) The
bottom long-dash curve is the assumed 30 percent reduced radiative heating of the LRB plume to
the trailing edge and the "option 9 LRB" curve is the 56 percent increase to the LRB radiation.
Because the LRB's would lack liner material and residual solid propellant particles, they would
not exhibit the high shutdown spike that the SRB's produce at separation.
The option 9 drawing suggests that the nozzles are touching each other. If they are to be
gimballed and are spaced, then the upper nozzle would be nearer to the Orbiter with a resultant
higher radiative heating to the trailing edge. The present maximum heating rate shown of the
total SSME plus option 9 LRB is around 25 Btu/ft:=sec. This corresponds to a radiation
equilibrium temperature of 2350°F. While the c'u_ent TPS on the trailing edge can take 2300°F
for 100 reuses and around 2600°F for one use, it is recommended that the option 9 study be
judicious in establishing its proximity to the body flap.
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LRB Separation
A preliminary analysis of LRB Separation was performed to evaluate their impact on the
separation system. The conditions that were examined consisted of nominal separation along
with aborts at 100 and 75 seconds. Four LRB configurations were examined. They were
LOX/LH2, LOX/RP1 pressure fed, LOX/RP1 pump fed, and LOX/CH4. In general, the nominal
separation conditions did not pose a problem for any of the LRB coldigurations. An off-nominal
case was run for all of the configurations. The conditions for this case were as follows:
Alpha=Beta= 10 degrees,roll,pitch,yaw rate= 5,2,2degrees/sec.
A pictorial presentation of the LOX/LH2 booster separation for the above conditions is presented
in Figure x,x. The LOX/RPI pressure fed booster was the only one that had a problem with this
design point. Due to the heavier weight of the pressure fed booster and the location of its center
of gravity, it required additional thrust for a clean separation.
Only the LOX/LH2 configuration was studied for the abort conditions. There are several
problems that affect abort separations. They are the increased weight of the vehicle, the center
of gravity is farther forward, and the dynamic pressure is considerably larger than normal. These
problems tend to make separation difficult for aborts. Compounding the problem is the fact that
the proximity aerodynamic flow'field for the boosters is completely different from the nominal
separation environment. For an abort at 100 seconds the thrust on the booster separation motors
would have to be increased approximately 25 to 50%. At 75 seconds the center of gravity is so
far forward that it is difficult to rotate the LRB nose away from the External Tank. It was found
that the forward thrust would have to be increased by I00 to 150% to have any chance at a
successful separation.
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Liquid Rocket Boosters Effect of Increased Length and Diameter
Studies were made of possible Liquid Rocket Booster lengths and diameters to identify
constraints which would prevent increases in wing loading due to aerodynamic flow distortions.
The following charts show the findings of these studies.
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